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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The Recent Growth in the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program 
The Social Security Disability Insurance program (DI) pays monthly 
cash benefits to disabled workers and their dependents, disabled spouses 
of deceased workers, and disabled children of workers when members of 
these groups meet program eligibility requirements. Currently about 
4.9 million persons (including dependents) are receiving DI benefits 
[14, p. 36]. Average monthly benefits are $290 per disabled worker and 
$90 per dependent [14, p. 46]. Since 1970, the number of beneficiaries 
has increased by 81 percent, up from 2.7 million persons [14, p. 36]. 
The amount of cash benefits paid in 1970 was about $3 billion. In 1978, 
the amount paid was nearly $12 billion, a 400 percent increase [14, p. 45]. 
The share of social security tax revenues going to the DI trust fund 
was raised from 9.8 percent in 1977 to 12.8 percent in 1978. It is 
scheduled to increase to 14.4 percent by 1990. The amount of social 
security tax revenues going to the DI trust fund was $9.6 billion in 1977. 
This figure will rise to an estimated $15.7 billion in 1979 and an 
estimated $40.5 billion in 1987, a 422 percent increase in a decade 
[35, p. 8], The burgeoning cost of DI in the early 1970's was so 
severe that it was estimated in 1976 that, with no legislative changes, 
the assets of the DI trust fund would run out in 1979 [36]. 
Although the growth of the DI program has been slower in the last 
several years and legislative changes forestalled the depletion of 
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the trust fund, the concern over the high cost of the program remains. 
The major reason for the growth of the program was the increase in 
the number of persons applying for and being awarded disability 
benefits. Several hypotheses have been suggested to explain this 
increase in the disability incidence rate. One that has received 
particular attention is that increases in benefit levels since 1970 
relative to earnings may provide an incentive for people with disabili­
ties to apply for benefits under DI. Between 1969 and 1975, there was 
an 82 percent increase in benefit levels [5]. In 1976 the average 
replacement rate (monthly DI benefits divided by predisability 
earnings) was 62 percent [4]. With replacement rates of this size, 
the opportunity cost of leaving the labor force is small and therefore 
applications higher. 
Another factor that may explain the increase in application rates 
is the subjectivity and confusion surrounding the definition of 
disability. At its inception in 1954, the DI program defined disability 
as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity 
because of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 
that can be expected to be of long continued and indefinite duration" 
[9, p. 47]. In 1965, the definition of disability, was changed such 
that the duration of the disability need only have lasted twelve months 
[9, p. 49]. The Social Security Administration is responsible for 
determining disability status when people apply for benefits. If the 
claim is denied, the claimant may request a judicial review. The 
judicial interpretation of the definition of disability has liberalized 
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the concept to include consideration of the residual capacities of the 
claimant, and what employment opportunities exist for a person with 
these capacities.^  
In light of the above interpretation, the Social Security 
Administration evaluates the DI applicant on the basis of three tests. 
Insured workers who have physical or mental impairments included on 
medical listings provided by the Social Security Administration are 
automatically granted benefits unless their monthly income exceeds 
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some maximum amount. Most awards are made on this basis. If the 
applicant fails to qualify on the basis of the medical listings, his 
impairments may be judged to be the equivalent of the impairments 
included in the medical listings and therefore awarded benefits. 
If an applicant fails the first two tests, he may qualify if he is an 
older worker with little education, has a history of work in unskilled 
occupations, or if he is found unable to qualify for a job that exists 
in several regions of the U.S. whether or not it exists in the region 
in which he lives [9, 15]. 
Although the congressional definition of disability stresses the 
medical nature of disability, the legal interpretation of disability 
and the criteria by which disability claims are evaluated explicitly 
T^his is a statement of the so-called Kerner doctrine. See 
Berkowitz, Johnson and Murphy [9] and Dixon [15]. 
2 
Persons who earned more than $140 a month in 1971 were presumed 
capable of "substantial gainful activity" and therefore were ineligible 
for DI benefits. Now this amount is $280. 
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recognize the interaction between physical impairments and other 
individual characteristics. This results in more claims being granted 
than if medical criteria alone were used. In addition, because the 
second and third tests involve a subjective evaluation, the awarding 
of DI benefits may be inconsistent. 
Other reasons discussed for the recent increase in the growth of 
the DI program include the extension of benefits to workers aged 31-50 
in 1960 and to workers aged 21-30 in 1967 [9, pp. 49-50]; the higher 
unemployment rate in recent years which may induce impaired persons 
who are unemployed to apply for benefits [19]; and increased awareness 
of the availability of disability benefits, perhaps coupled with a 
reduction in the stigma attached to accepting benefits ("living on 
welfare") [5]. 
In general, the question this thesis addresses is what causes a 
person to become disabled? One person who has a physical impairment 
such as the inability to walk may continue to work in spite of his 
limitation. Another may choose to withdraw from the labor force 
and apply for disability benefits. More specifically, the objectives 
are first to determine the relative importance of social/demographic, 
economic, and health variables in the labor supply decisions of physically 
impaired persons. This analysis would provide guidelines for policy 
making. If health variables are the more Important determinants of 
labor supply, then granting of DI benefits on medical grounds alone 
is appropriate. If social and/or economic variables are more important. 
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the expansion of Income maintenance programs financed through general 
revenues might be investigated. 
The second objective is to assess the importance of benefit 
levels on the probability that an impaired person will apply for DI. 
The expectation is that the higher benefit levels are relative to 
earnings, the greater the probability of application. If this hypothe­
sis is correct, one way to control the costs of the DI program is to 
reduce benefits. The third objective is to examine the awards process 
to gain some insight as to what variables increase the probability 
of being accepted as a DI beneficiary. 
Finally, we wish to compare our results to results reported by 
Berkowitz, Johnson and Murphy (BJM) [9] who constructed and tested 
similar models using 1965 data. 
Plan of the thesis 
Chapter two discusses the estimation of the reservation wage 
variable that is used in the labor supply models in Chapter three. 
The use of actual wages presents some statistical problems which are 
avoided when reservation wages are used [21]. Chapter three presents 
the results obtained from testing labor supply models which include 
social, economic, and health variables. These models are designed to 
assess the relative importance of the three groups of variables. A 
comparison is made between results using 1965 data and 1971 data. 
Chapter four discusses the results of the estimations of the demand 
for and the supply of DI benefits. Chapter five concludes with a 
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summary of the results and a discussion of the policy implications, 
avenues for further research,and the shortcomings of the analysis. 
Description of the data 
The data used are from the 1972 Survey of Disabled and Nondisabled 
Adults [29] conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Social 
Security Administration. This was the second national survey designed 
to provide information on the disabled population in the United 
States. The first was the 1956 Survey of Disabled Adults. The 1972 
survey Included nondisabled persons as well as the disabled. The 
sample in the 1972 survey consisted of 17,997 persons, aged 20-64, 
11,700 of whom indicated they were disabled before October 1969 in 
the 1970 5 percent Census sample.^  Of the 11,700 people, 4264 no 
longer considered themselves disabled in 1971 and 1200 of the people 
who were not disabled in 1969 considered themselves disabled in 1971. 
The final sample consisted of 8633 persons who were disabled and 9364 
who said they were nondisabled. 
The 1972 survey contained a wide variety of information on things 
such as work experience, health conditions, work limitations, personal 
attitude, knowledge of government programs, family income and wealth 
and social relations [34]. In addition, the information on the survey 
was matched with the Social Security Administration master beneficiary 
record so that covered earnings were available back to 1951 [1]. 
T^he description of the survey is from Allen [1]. 
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The disabled sample consisted of 3903 men and 4733 women. We 
limited our analysis to disabled men for two reasons. First, the 
labor force behavior of women is not as well understood as that of 
men,^  and second, because of a budget constraint which did not 
permit the analysis of both sexes. 
The 1972 survey was constructed such that positive responses to 
questions about health are not associated with reduced labor supply 
2 
which has been a problem in other research. Respondents were asked 
if they had difficulty performing a variety of activities and if so 
whether they could perform the activity at all [29]. These responses 
3 
were independent of the measures of labor supply. 
For a further discussion of details about the data we used see 
[1]. 
B^ut see Cain [12] and Bowen and Finegan [11]. Also see the 
suggestions for future research in Chapter five. 
2 See Cullinan and Curington [13, pp. 2-5] for a discussion. 
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The conceptual framework for the relationship between health 
and labor supply we use distinguishes among pathology, impairment, 
functional limitation and disability. Pathology is an illness or 
injury which may or may not result in an impairment. For example, a 
cold is an illness which is unlikely to result in any permanent damage, 
whereas cancer may result in a loss of limbs or organs. The loss of 
a leg may result in a functional limitation (inability to stoop, say) 
while the loss of a breast would not. The existence of functional 
limitation may or may not result in reduced labor supply (disability), 
Whether or not functional limitations result in disability depends 
on other social and economic factors except in extreme cases. For 
instance, the availability of other forms of income (transfer payments, 
asset income) may provide an incentive for a person with limitations 
to reduce labor supply. See BJM [9], Haber [17], and Cullinan and 
Curington [15] for more discussion of this point. 
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CHAPTER II. ESTIMATING RESERVATION WAGES 
Introduction 
In this chapter we specify the procedure to estimate the wage 
variable which is used in the labor supply equations as an independent 
variable. The process involves three steps. First we use probit to 
obtain estimates of a coefficient that will correct for bias in the 
wage estimation equation for those who work. Next we use ordinary 
least squares regressions (including a bias correction variable) to get 
unbiased estimates of the coefficients that determine wage offers. 
Finally we combine the estimates in steps one and two to derive 
estimates of the coefficients of the reservation wage equation. 
The Problem 
The appropriate wage variable to use in labor supply regressions 
is the reservation wage rather than actual wages. The reservation 
wage is the wage that must be paid in order to induce labor force 
participation. The reason that reservation wages are preferable is 
because variations in actual wages have little effect on labor supply. 
For example, changes in actual wages are unlikely to change the hours 
worked of participants (as long as actual wages are above reservation 
wages)^  because institutional factors, custom, etc., deteriaine the 
length of the work day or week. Similarly, changes in actual wages 
would not be expected to have an effect on nonparticipants until the 
reservation wage is reached. The problem is that the reservation 
wage for participants and nonparticipants is unobservable. 
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One way of estimating reservation wages is to regress actual wages 
on various independent variables such as age, education, geographic 
location, etc., for those people who work.^  The estimates of the 
parameters are then used to calculate wages for those who do not work. 
The problem here is one of sample selection bias which occurs when 
observations on the dependent variable are missing. Only those 
people who work are selected into the sample to estimate wages. This 
causes biased estimates of the coefficients and/or coefficients 
which appear to be significant when they are not. For example, if the 
above procedure is used to estimate wages for nonworking women, one 
of the significant variables is the presence of children. Women with 
children are shown to earn lower wages than women without children. 
The interpretation of these results might be that discrimination exists 
against such women. This is not necessarily so, given the procedure 
used to estimate the wages. It may be that women who work have fewer 
children [21]. That is, the characteristics of the working women may 
not fit the characteristics of the nonworking women. 
The Procedure 
2 
Consider the following model: 
W- = a + e (1) 
i i 
= ^ 2? "*• 2^ (2) 
S^ee Boskin [10] and Hall [18], 
2 
The following discussion of sample selection bias is taken from 
Heckman [21]. 
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where W- is the reservation wage and W„ is the wage offer for the ith 
i^ i^ 
individual, and X. and X„ are vectors of explanatory variables. We 
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cannot use the wage offer equation to estimate reservation wages 
because there are missing observations. We observe W^  if and only if 
people work. Given this sample selection rule, 
E(W„ /X_ B, W, > 0) = X- e + E(e, /W_ > 0) 
i i i "^ i 
= e + E(e /e > -X B). 
i '^ i i i 
In general we expect that the second term on the right will not be 
equal to zero and therefore estimation of the wage offer omits a 
variable. 
If we assume and E2 are jointly normally distributed then 
°22 
E(e„ /e» > -X„ 3) = rry 
4 4 i^ (<^ 22^  
where = —55 
2 'it 
and (p. = -
The denominator of is the distribution function and the numerator is 
the density function for the standard normal random variable. If one 
could estimate (|)^  and therefore one could enter it into equation 
(3) and use ordinary least squares to obtain unbaised estimates of g. 
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In the case of censored sample one can use probit analysis to 
estimate ({)^  and thus A censored sample is one where it is possible 
to use the sample to estimate the probability that any observation will 
be observed. In terms of our model, we can estimate the probability 
of observing wage offers by estimating the probability that people work. 
People work if and only if the wage offer is greater than the reserva­
tion wage (Wg > and is greater than zero only if people 
work. 
E(W_ > W /X e - X a, W > 0) = X_ g - X. a + —  ^X, 
2i 1^  li 2. 2^  1. (0^ )^1/2 1 
We can use probit to estimate 
X e - X a 
which can then be used to estimate X^ . 
The probit can be specified as follows 
\ 
where the X^  are independent variables which appear in both the wage 
offer and reservaEion wage equation and the X^  are variables which appear 
only in the wage offer equation and the X^  are variables which appear 
only in the reservation wage equation. From the probit we get estimates 
3 .  -  « .  
of , mr and T-TT . Using the first estimate, 
("22) " ('22)" ("22> 
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we can get estimates of lambda to be used as an independent variable 
in the wage offer equation. Ordinary least squares estimation of the 
wage offer equation (including lambda) yield unbiased estimates of 
and With estimates of from OLS and the estimates of 
r /_ \l/2 1 
(022) 
YJ2 fro™ the probit we can calculate estimates of (o^ g) 
Ml . -- we With this estimate of (G__) and probit estimates of . , 
("22> 
B. - a. 
can derive estimates of a». With estimates of —from probit and 
("22' 
estimates of S, from OLS we can obtain estimates of the a.. ] J 
The Model 
The model consists of three equations; the probit equation, the 
wage offer equation, and the derived reservation wage equation. The 
probit equation is: 
0^ " ''0 1^ " "1 2^ ' ""l h " ^ 3^ 
LFP = —  ^+ — EXl + — EX2 + — EX3 
a 0 a a 
~ ^7 ~ ^ 7 
+ — EX4 + — EDUC + — SICK + — MARST 
a a a a 
Bg - Og Bg - ctg a 
+ — MSPABS + — RURE + — SPINC - — NDEPC 
a a a a 
*^ 12 X^3 A 
INCFA PUBTR - — PRVTR; 0 0 a 
T^his estimate is an average if there is more than one different 
independent variable in the wage offer equation. 
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where 
EXl = 1 if 2 < (age - education - 5) <15, 0 otherwise, 
EX2 = 1 if 14 < (age - education - 5) <26, 0 otherwise, 
EX,3 = 1 if 25 < (age - education - 5) <37, 0 otherwise, 
EX4 = 1 if 36 < (age - education - 5) <48, 0 otherwise, 
EDUC = years of education, 
SICK = 1 if the respondent indicated he was limited in the kind or 
amount of work he could do, 0 otherwise, 
MARST = 1 if married, spouse present, 0 otherwise, 
MSPABS = 1 if married, spouse absent, 0 otherwise, 
RURE = 1 if lived on a farm or in the country, 0 otherwise, 
SPINC = spouse's income, 
NDEPC = number of dependent children, 
INCFA = income from assets, 
PUBTR = public transfer payments, 
PRVTR = private transfer payments, 
LFP =5 1 if the respondent worked in 1971, Q otherwise. 
The probit equation gives us an estimation of the probability that 
people work. People work only if the wage offer they receive is greater 
than or equal to their reservation wage. Thus the coefficients of the 
independent variables are expressed to reflect this relationship.^  
Given this, the expected signs of the coefficients depend on the sign 
T^he refer to coefficients which appear in the wage offer 
equation and the refer to coefficients which appear in the reservation 
wage equation, o is (#22) ' 
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of a, the expected sign of the coefficients in the reservation wage 
equation, and the expected sign of the coefficients in the wage offer 
equation. Previous labor force participation estimates give us, 
however, some expectations regarding the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. 
The EX1-EX4 variables are included to measure the pure effect 
of age on labor force participation. (Education is subtracted because 
we include it as a separate independent variable.) In general we 
expect a strong positive relationship between labor force participa­
tion and the variables EXl and EX2 because these variables include 
younger men who have been shown to have a strong labor force attach­
ment [11]. The sign of EX3 and EX4 is ambiguous because these 
variables represent older men (55-64 years of age) whose labor force 
attachment is weaker [11].^  
Education is expected to have a positive effect on labor force 
participation because the opportunity cost of nonparticipation is 
larger for those people with more years of schooling. Previous 
research has shown that labor force participation rates for males 
steadily increases as education levels increase [11]. 
The ages represented by the EX variables overlap because years 
of education are subtracted. The maximum and minimum ages are as 
follows: 
Variable Minimum Maximum 
EXl 25 years 38 years 
EX2 25 years 49 years 
EX3 31 years 60 years 
EX4 42 years 64 years 
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The health dummy is expected to have a negative effect on labor 
force participation because ill health reduces the opportunity cost of 
not working or conversely increases the costs of working in the form 
of difficulty of performing certain tasks, discomfort, etc. Not only 
does ill health increase the costs of working in the form of discomfort 
but it may increase out-of-pocket costs as well. Transportation 
costs, for example, may be higher for handicapped people if they must 
rely on special buses which have fork lifts to get them in and out. 
The single best predictor of labor force participation for males 
is marital status. Bowen and Finegan [11] have reported participation 
rates for prime age males who were married with wife present compared 
to those who were separated from their wives. The latter group had 
a participation rate 18.5 percentage points lower than the former. 
The importance of marital status as an indicator of labor force 
behavior may be explained in two ways. First, marriage implies a 
greater necessity for earning money income because of larger financial 
responsibilities. Second, marriage may serve as a proxy for "normalcy." 
Married men seem better able to find and keep a job than those who are 
not. For these reasons, we expect a strong, positive relationship 
between the married, spouse present variable and labor force participa­
tion and a negative relationship between the married, spouse absent 
variable and labor force participation. 
We include a dummy variable for rural environment for two reasons. 
First, living in a nonurban setting may reduce job opportunities and 
therefore participation. Second, living in a rural environment may 
16 
increase the opportunities for home production (gardening) which would 
also reduce labor force participation. 
The number of dependent children is expected to have a positive 
effect on labor force participation by Increasing a male's taste for 
money income because of increased financial responsibilities. 
In general, we expect a negative relationship between the other 
income variables (spouse's income, asset income, public and private 
transfers) and labor force participation. The larger the amount of 
other income an individual has, the smaller is the necessity of working 
(assuming leisure is a normal good). Asset income, however, may serve 
as a proxy for a person's taste for work. People who are highly 
motivated to work may acquire more assets and thus have more asset 
income than those people less motivated to work. In this case, the 
relationship between the two variables is positive. 
In the case of public and private transfers, the interpretation 
of the relationship may pose a problem. The direction of causality 
is not obvious. Is labor force participation reduced because of the 
availability of transfer income.^  
The wage offer equation is: 
Respondents who received disability insurance benefits or Aid 
to the Blind or Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled 
(DIABAPTD) were excluded from the sample for this reason. Also see 
Berkowitz, Johnson and Murphy [9]. 
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WAGES = 3q + EXl + 62 EX2 + $3 EX3 + g, EX4 + 65 EDUC 
+ 6, SICK + By MARST + gg MSPABS + g_ RURE + yX  ^
where the independent variables have been defined above and the 
dependent variable is the hourly wage rate for labor force participants 
in 1971. 
In general, we expect that the independent variables in the wage 
offer equation reflect the marginal productivity of the person who 
receives the wage. As noted above, the EX1-EX4 variables reflect the 
age of the respondent. The effect of increasing age on wage offers is 
ambiguous. Increases in age may indicate increases in experience thus 
increasing the person's marginal productivity and wage offers. On 
the other hand, depending on the individual's occupation, increasing 
age may signal increasing infirmity and thus a decrease in marginal 
productivity and wage offers. 
The more years of education a person has, the higher is his 
marginal productivity and wage offer. If an individual is limited in 
the kind and amount of work he can do because of health, we expect 
wage offers to be lower. As noted above, the marital status variable 
can be thought of as an indicator of the psychological factors which 
\ is the bias correction variable which is obtained from the 
probit estimates. It is the ratio of the distribution function to 
the density function of the standard normal random variable from 
X, 3 - X a 
i i 
 ^ to infinity for the ith observation, y is the estimated 
*^ 12 " °22 
coefficient of A and is equal to TTT~ ' 
^22' 
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mny be viewed by the employer as evidence of stability, thereby 
increasing marginal productivity and wage offers. We expect wage 
offers in a rural environment to be lower than in urban areas reflecting 
labor demand conditions. 
The reservation wage equation is: 
RESW = Oq + EXl + ag EX2 + EX3 + EX4 + SICK 
+ OLj MARST + «g MSPABS + (%_ RURE + SPINC + NDEPC 
+ PUBTR + PRVTR 
where the independent variables are as defined above and RESW is the 
hourly reservation wage. 
Note that the reservation wage equation is derived from the probit 
equation and the wage offer equation. That is, estimates of coefficients 
in these two equations (along with estimates of a) are combined to 
get estimates of the alphas. 
An individual has various alternatives to working available to 
him or her and the reservation wage depends on the value of the person's 
time when involved in these other activities as well as alternative 
sources of income and the costs of working. 
The older a person is, the greater the reservation wage is 
expected to be because as age increases, the disutility of working 
increases. Similarly, if a person has health problems, the more 
distasteful working is likely to be resulting in a higher reservation 
wage. In addition, as noted above, health problems may increase the 
explicit costs of working which also results in a higher reservation 
wage. Marital status is expected to be negatively related to the 
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reservation wage for males because they have traditionally shouldered 
the income earning responsibilities of a family. Thus in order to 
meet this responsibility, they accept lower wages. On the other hand, 
if the spouse is absent, we expect the reservation wage to be higher 
because the income-earning responsibility is lessened. If a person 
lives on a farm or in the country we expect his reservation wages to 
be higher because the opportunities for valuable home-time would be 
greater than in an urban environment. We expect the availability 
of other income such as asset income to increase the reservation 
wage because other sources of income are substitutes for labor income. 
As the number of dependent children increases, the reservation wages 
are expected to go down because the larger the family size, the larger 
are income requirements. 
The Results 
The probit equation 
The probit equation was estimated using a 20 percent subsample 
from the 1972 Survey of Nondisabled and Disabled Adults. The 20 percent 
subsample consisted of 1268 white males and 353 black males who were 
between 25 and 64 years of age. The sample was divided into black and 
white cohorts because of the suspicion that these two groups come 
from different populations. Bowen and Finegan note that the participa­
tion rates for prime-age black are lower than for their white counter­
parts [11]. Hall [18] and Boskin [10] also report racial differences 
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when analyzing labor force participation and hours worked. 
The age limits were chosen because we wanted to eliminate those 
people who do not work because they are still in school (ages 18-24) 
and those people who have retired (ages 65 and over). 
Table 1 presents the results of this estimation. Of the fourteen 
independent variables, eight were significant at the 5 percent level 
for white males and four were significant at the 5 percent level for 
black males. 
Given the minimum and maximum years of education^  the variables 
EX1-EX4 represent the following ages: 
Variable Minimum age Maximum age 
EXl 25 years 38 years 
EX2 25 years 49 years 
EX3 31 years 60 years 
EX4 42 years 64 years 
The coefficients of all these variables, for white males, is positive, 
as expected, and EXl, EX2, and EX3 are significant. For white males, 
being aged 25-60 significantly increases the probability of labor 
force participation. The coefficients of EX1-EX4 are much smaller 
for black males than for white males (EX4 is negative) and none is 
significant. This suggests that being a member of the prime-age group 
(25-54) does not have the same effect on labor force participation 
for black males as it does for white males and supports our hypothesis 
1 
For males the maximum years of education reported in the 
sample is nineteen years for whites and eighteen years for blacks. 
The minimum for both groups is zero. 
Table 1. Probit equation^  
White males Black males 
Independent variables 
Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio 
Experience/age 
2-14 years (EXl) .6021 2.5* .0839 .2 
15-25 years (EX2) .4409 2.1* .0997 .3 
26-36 years (EX3) .5377 3.0* .1914 .6 
37-47 years (EX4) .2626 1.6 -.2768 -1.1 
Education (EDUC) .0833 4.9* -.0017 .1 
Health dummy (SICK) -.9800 -7.4* -1.8296 -7.0* 
Married, spouse present (MARST) .5612 4.0* .6555 2.9* 
Married, spouse absent (MSPABS) -.0567 -1.0 .3461 1.1 
Rural residence (RURE) .1655 1.2 .2205 .8 
Spouse's income (SPINC) .000003 .1 .00005 1.0 
No. of dependent children (NDEPC) .0179 .4 .0571 .8 
Asset income (INCFA) -.000007 -.2 .0001 .4 
Public transfers (PUIJTR) -.0003 -9.9* -.0004 -5.8* 
Private transfers (PRVTR -.0002 -3.8* -.0002 -1.2 
Constant .2470 1.1 1.5241 4.3* 
N 1268 353 
T^he dependent variable is labor force participation. 
C^omputed using data from [29]. 
*Signifleant at the 5% level. 
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that black and white men come from different populations. 
The education variable has a positive, significant coefficient 
for white males which agrees with our expectation that more years 
of schooling increases the opportunity cost of nonparticipation. 
For black males, the coefficient of the education variable is negative, 
very small, and nonsignificant indicating that schooling has little 
effect on participation. This result is consistent with work done by 
Bowen and Finegan [11]. First, they report that participation rates of 
blacks are less sensitive to changes in educational attainment levels 
than for all prime-age males which agrees with our small, insignificant 
coefficient. Second, the percentage of the black male population in 
lower education categories is higher than for prime-age males as a 
whole. The negative relationship we get may be explained by the fact 
that blacks with less education "...because of a more random selection 
procedure, this group contains a relatively large proportion of individ­
uals with considerable innate ability, drive, and so on" [11, p. 57]. 
The health dummy coefficient is negative and significant for both 
groups as expected, although it is almost twice as large for the black 
sample. If blacks are over-represented in unskilled occupations, 
then ill health would be expected to have a larger negative effect on 
participation^  
The coefficient of the variable indicating the respondent is 
married is positive and significant for both groups. The dummy 
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variable representing married, spouse absent is negative and non­
significant for white males. The coefficient for black males, while 
not significant, is large and positive. An explanation for this 
result may be that a larger percentage of black males fall into the 
category of married, spouse absent. As a result, other characteristics, 
leading to higher participation for this group, dominate financial 
responsibilities (the lack thereof) which suggests lower participation. 
Two of the four other income variables are negative and significant 
as expected for white males, although for both public and private 
transfers the coefficients are small. Both the coefficients for asset 
income (which is negative) and spouse's income (which is positive) 
are small and insignificant. For black males, only the coefficient of 
public transfers is significant. The remaining independent variables, 
rural environment, and number of dependent children are insignificant 
for both groups. 
The correlation coefficients among the independent variables for 
both groups show little evidence of multicollinearity^ . The largest 
correlation coefficient in the matrix for black males is .53 between 
EXl and EX2, For whites, it is .58 between EX2 and EX3 and between 
public and private transfers. The only real difference between the 
correlation matrices of the two groups is the correlation between public 
and private transfers. As noted above, for whites it is .58. For 
S^ee Appendix A for the correlation matrices of the independent 
variables in the probit equations. 
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blacks, it is .05o Public transfers include items such as unemploy­
ment compensation, Veterans' payments, etc. Private transfers 
include contributions from family outside the household plus things 
such as private disability pensions. Whites are more likely to receive 
both than are blacks possibly because fewer blacks have private 
disability insurance. Having a private disability/pension plan might 
indicate prior labor force attachment and perhaps a "better" job. 
These results are consistent with the importance of the private transfer 
payment variable for white males in labor force behavior and its 
nonimportance for blacks. 
The wage offer equation 
The wage offer equation was estimated using the same subsample 
used to estimate the probit equation except that those respondents 
who did not work in 1971 (LFP = 0) were excluded. The white male 
sample consisted of 1051 men aged 25-64. The black sample had 224 
2 
observations. The R was .43 for the white group and .51 for the 
black group. Of the ten independent variables, five were significant 
at the 5 percent level for the white group. For black males, none was 
significant. The wage offer regressions include the estimated lambda 
coefficient obtained from the probit and therefore, the bias introduced 
when using truncated samples is avoided. Table 2 presents the 
results. 
The coefficients of the EX1-EX4 independent variables are negative 
and only the first is significant for white males. If these variables 
SL b 
Table 2. Wage offer equation with lambda ' 
White males Black males 
Independent variables 
Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio 
Experience/age 
2-14 years (EXl) -1.3062 -2. 6* .9546 .9 
15-25 years (EX2) -.3092 -.7 .6447 .7 
26-36 years (EX3) -.2155 -.5 .1956 .2 
37-47 years (EX4) -.4874 -1.2 .7543 1.0 
Education (EDUC) .3581 8.9* .0735 .9 
Health dummy (SICK) -1.1686 -4.3* -.0397 -.4 
Married, spouse present (MARST) 1.3603 4.2* -.0170 -.1 
Married, spouse absent (MSPABS) .3607 .2 -.0878 -.1 
Rural residence (RURE) -.0035 -.1 -1.2028 1.5 
Lambda 1.1764 5.1* -.5443 -.5 
Constant .5062 .8 3.0233 3.1* 
r2 
.4336 .5139 
N 1051 224 
T^he dependent variable is actual hourly wages in 1971. 
C^omputed using data from [29]. 
*Signlficant at the 5% level. 
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represent experience, then the estimates for white males suggests 
that having only 2-14 years of experience reduces wage offers by 
$1.31 per hour, other things being equal. That is, the lack of 
experience is associated with less marginal productivity. The pattern 
for white males suggests that being older decreases the reduction in 
wages until the oldest group is reached. Then, being older increases 
the reduction in wage offers. This lends support for interpreting the 
first three age group variables as proxies for experience. The fourth 
may be interpreted as a proxy for decreased marginal productivity due 
to advancing age, closeness to retirement, etc. 
The coefficients of these variables for black males are positive 
and insignificant. The pattern for black males moving from younger 
to older age groups is opposite that of the white males until the oldest 
group is reached (EX4). The youngest black males have higher wage 
offers than do black males in the next two age groups. To interpret 
age as a proxy for experience in this case would seem inappropriate. 
Perhaps, for black males, increasing age represents decreasing marginal 
productivity due to infirmity. If blacks are under-represented in 
occupations where experience is perceived as being more important, 
such as white-collar jobs, and over-represented in jobs which require 
more physical capability^  then the differences between the two groups 
can be explained. 
The education coefficient is positive and significant at the 
one percent level for white males as expected. It is positive, 
insignificant and small for the black group. If relatively more blacks 
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are concentrated in lower education attainment levels as reported by 
Bowen and Finegan [11] and relatively more blacks are in unskilled 
jobs, then the latter result is not surprising. Increases in years of 
education may not represent increases in marginal productivity for 
this group. That is, a person with a grade school education may be 
as well equipped to drive a taxi as a person with a college education. 
The health dummy has a large, negative coefficient for white 
males as expected. For the black group, the coefficient is quite 
small and insignificant. We would expect that ill health would be 
an important explanation of wage offers for black males because of their 
representation in unskilled jobs which require good health. Perhaps 
the variable we are using (response to whether health limited kind 
and amount of work one could do) does not measure what we want to 
measure for this group. The perception of ill health on the part of 
the respondent may not be the same as that of the employer. 
Again, for the black group, the coefficient of the married, spouse 
present variable is small and has the wrong sign but conforms to our 
expectation for white males. For white males the assumption is that 
marital status is a proxy for stability or desireable psychological traits 
which are perceived to Increase marginal productivity. For black males 
this may not be true. As Bowen and Finegan point out, "...a dispro­
portionately large fraction of prime-age Negro males were not married 
with wife present" [11, p. 52]. If married, spouse present is not the 
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norm for black males, that status can hardly be judged as representing 
"normal" characteristics. 
The married, spouse absent variable is insignificant for both 
groups. The rural environment dummy has negative coefficients for 
both as expected but is much larger for black males indicating that 
living in a rural environment has a disproportionately large effect 
on black wage offers. 
The reservation wage equation 
The reservation wage equation is calculated from the wage offer 
equation and the probit equation. The first step is to calculate a. 
Recall that the wage offer equation has one independent variable that 
does not appear in the reservation wage equation. In our model, that 
variable is the education variable. We have an estimate of the 
coefficient for education from the probit which is interpreted as 
— . From the wage offer equation we have an unbiased estimate of g_. 
a J 
Given both of these, we can derive a. From our estimates: 
3^  = .3581 for white males, 
3^  = .0735 for black males 
and 
5^ 
~ .0833 for white males, 
5^ 1 
—TT = -o0017 for black maleso 
0 
^See Tables 1 and 2. 
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Therefore 
.3581 
a 
.0735 
= .0833 and â = 4.2989 for white males, 
= -.0017 and ô = -43.2353 for black males. 
To calculate the alpha coefficients of the reservation wage 
equation, we use the estimates of a and estimates of the coefficients 
from the probit and wage offer equations. For example, from probit 
Bl -
we have estimates of and from the wage offer equation, we 
a 
have estimates of 
Bl -
X = .6021 for white males, 
a 
h - "i 
= .0839 for black males 
0 
and 
= -1.3062 for white males, 
A 1 
= .9546 for black males. 
Therefore 
-1.3062 - a 
4.2989 
9546 - a 
1 
— = .6021 for white males. 
-43.2353 
and 
= -3.8946 for white males, 
= 4<.5820 for black males. 
^See Tables 1 and 2. 
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The reservation wage coefficients are presented in Table 3. 
For white males, the coefficients of the EX1-EX4 are all negative; 
for black males, they are positive except for the coefficient of EX4. 
The negative sign for white males may be due to the fact that working 
is the norm for this group regardless of age until age 65. Reservation 
wages increase over age groups, however, indicating that as one gets 
older, the opportunity cost of working increases. The positive signs 
of the coefficients for the first three age groups may be because 
black males in these age groups perceive more alternatives to working 
or value leisure more. These alternatives may disappear with advancing 
age or older black males have reduced expectations about wages they 
can hope to receive. 
The coefficient of the health dummy is positive for both groups 
and very large for blacks. If blacks are more likely to be in 
physically demanding occupations, the cost of working may be extremely 
high if one has a disability. The coefficient of the married, 
spouse present variable is negative as expected for white males, large 
and positive for black males. Black males may have a large response 
to alternative sources of income such as a wife's potential salary. 
That is, the increased financial responsibility associated with marriage 
may be supplanted by the possibility of substitute income that a spouse 
may generate. The rural environment variable has a positive coefficient 
as expected for blacks but a negative one for whites. If labor force 
participation is the norm for white males, living where job opportunities 
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Table 3. Reservation wage equation^  
Independent variables 
White males 
Coefficient 
Black males 
Coefficient 
Experience/age 
2-14 years (EXl) -3.8946 4.5820 
15-25 years (EX2) -2.2046 4.9553 
26-36 years (EX3) -2.5270 8.4708 
37-47 years (EX4) -1.6163 -11.2132 
Health dummy (SICK) 3.0443 79.1430 
Married, spouse present (MARST) -1.0522 28.3237 
Married, spouse absent (MSPABS) .6044 14.8759 
Rural residence (RURE) -.7150 8.3306 
Spouse's income (SPINC) -.00001 .0022 
No. of dependent children (NDEPC) -.0770 2.4687 
Asset income (INCFA) .00003 .0043 
Public transfers (PUBTR) .0013 -.0173 
Private transfers (PRVTR) .0009 -.0086 
Constant -.5556 68.9182 
â 4.2989 -43.2353 
C^alculated from estimates of the 
Table 2. 
coefficients in Table 1 and 
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are fewer may reduce reservation wages for that group. The sign of 
the coefficient for the number of dependent children variable is 
positive for black males and negative for white males but quite 
small. 
The coefficients of the other income variables are expected to be 
positive and are, with the exception of spouse's income, for white 
males although all are very small. The coefficients of public and 
private transfers are negative for the black group. 
Summary and Conclusion 
For white males, we are satisfied with the wage estimation results. 
More than half of the independent variables are significant at the 
5 percent level in the probit equation. With the exception of spouse's 
income (which is very small) and the rural environment dummy, all of 
the variables have the expected sign. The wage offer equation has a 
2 
reasonable R for cross-sectional data and four of the nine independent 
variables are significant. The resulting coefficients of the 
reservation wage equation seem reasonable. 
The results for black males are less satisfying. For the probit, 
only three of the fourteen variables are significant. For the wage 
offer equation, none of the independent variables is significant, 
2 
although the R is reasonable. The reservation wage equation for 
blacks strains credibility. The size of the estimated standard 
deviation indicates that the model for black males needs to be 
respecified. Recall the â is estimated by having at least one 
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independent variable in the wage offer equation that is not in the 
reservation wage equation. In our model, that variable is education. 
We chose education because reservation wages depend on the value of 
alternative uses of time. Education, while obviously important in 
wage offers, would seem to have little effect on the former. 
Perhaps for black males, education is the inappropriate variable 
to omit. Respecification of the model for this group should include 
variables which measure discrimination, for example, in the wage offer 
equation and variables which measure motivational factors, such as 
whether the respondent attended segregated schools in the reservation 
wage equation. 
Because the estimates of reservation wages are unbiased for 
both groups, and because our budget constraint precluded further 
efforts to come up with more satisfactory results for blacks, we use 
these results in our labor supply equations. 
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CHAPTER III. LABOR SUPPLY AND HEALTH 
Introduction 
The major objective of this chapter is to investigate the effect 
of poor health on labor force behavior. Specifically we compare 
models of labor supply which do not include health variables to 
models which do to see if the addition of health variables increases 
—2 
the explanatory power of the model in terms of R . We expect that 
functional limitations by themselves do not explain the disability 
status of impaired persons. A person becomes disabled (reduces labor 
supply) because of the interaction between ill health and other 
economic and social characteristics. If this hypothesis is supported 
by our results then it would suggest that income replacement for 
disabled persons based on medical grounds is inappropriate and 
policies of preventive health care would not be expected to reduce 
the cost of the DI program. 
Berkowits, Johnson and Murphy (BJri) [9] conducted similar research 
using 1965 data. A second objective is to compare our results, using 
1971 data, to their results. If the results are consistent, our 
research strengthens the conclusions drawn by BJM. 
In addition, we want to examine which types of functional 
limitations are important in causing reduced labor supply. Information 
of this sort might provide guidelines for preventive or remedial 
health policies. If, for example, a person who has difficulty seeing 
reduces his labor supply, then a program designed to make glasses 
readily available to him might induce him to return to work. 
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Finally, we wish to see if we can gain some insights into the 
relationship between health and other determinants of labor supply. 
Bowen and Finegan [11, p. 65] have noted that much of the observed 
relationship between education and labor force participation rates 
may be due to health. BJM [9, p. 91] point out that some of the effect 
of marital status on labor supply may be caused by the relationship 
between marital status and mental or nervous disorders. 
First we provide a brief theoretical framework from which we 
derive our models of labor supply. Next we specify our statistical 
model and present our results. Finally we summarize our results 
and draw conclusions. 
Theoretical Framework^  
The theory of labor supply assumes that the individual maximizes 
a concave utility function subject to a resource constraint. The 
major resource owned by consumers is time which may be used in two 
ways. The person may spend his time working, for which he receives 
a wage or he may use his time in nonmarket activities called leisure, 
the opportunity cost of which is the wage rate. The money earned by 
working may be spent on goods and services which can be aggregated 
into a composite good. The individual also may have nonlabor 
income. 
T^he following discussion is based on Ashenfelter and Heckman 
[2]. 
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The individual maximizes: 
U = U(L, X) 
where L = hours spent on nonmarket activities (leisure), 
X = the composite good. 
The resource constraint is as follows: 
PX = W(T - L) + Y = VfH + Y 
where H h T - L, 
and P = the price of the composite good, 
W = the hourly wage rate, 
T = total time available, 
Y = nonlabor income, and 
H = hours spent working. 
Equation (6) can be written as 
PX 4- wL = wT + Ï 
to point out the concept of "full income" [7] which consists of the 
amount spent on goods and services, and on leisure. 
Equations (5) and (7) can be combined to yield the following 
constrained utility maximizing equations 
$ = u(L, X) + x(px + WL - wr - Y) . 
The first order conditions for utility maximization are: 
37 
(8) 
(9) 
• ^ = P X + W L - W T - Y  =  0  (10) 
for given values of P, W, and Y. 
These first order conditions require that the marginal utility of 
leisure equal the marginal utility of income times the wage rate; that 
the marginal utility from consuming the composite commodity equals 
the marginal utility of income times the price of the commodity; and 
that the budget constraint be fulfilled. Equations (8), (9), and (10) are 
a system of three equations in three unknowns (L, X, and X) and three 
parameters (P, W, and Y). The solution of this system of equations 
results in three equations, one of which is the demand for leisure: 
Since there are only two uses of time in the model, leisure and 
working, any change in the amount of time allocated to leisure must 
result in an equal and opposite change in the amount of time allocated 
to work. Thus, the supply of labor can be expressed as follows : 
L = L(W, P, Y) 
H = H(W, P, Y) (11) 
A standard way of estimating labor supply is to hypothesize a linear 
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approximation of equation (11)[2]. A linear model might take the 
following form; 
H = $0 + + 6^  + e (12) 
The models we estimate use equation (12) as a basis.^  
The focus thus far has been on the theory of labor supply in 
terms of the determinants of the number of hours worked. For primary 
workers, the number of hours worked may not be a choice variable. 
Institutional constraints may only allow an all-or-nothing decision 
about working or not working. For this reason we are interested in 
the determinants of labor supply in the form of participation rates 
as well. The major theoretical difference between hours worked models 
and participation models is that there is no income effect associated 
There is a problem in using the linear model in that the substi­
tution effect of a change in wages may be negative under certain 
conditions. The change in hours resulting from a change in the wage 
rate is equal to a substitution effect and an income effect. Referring 
to equation (12): 
I# = «1 = s + H « 
3H 
where S is the substitution effect and is positive, and — is the 
income effect and is negative. 
Rewriting the above equation; 
Ç ^  s  ^H IT, 
*"1 9Y 
3H 
Empirically and have been shown to be less than zero [3]. 
If H is small, then it is possible for S to be negative. Given 
"well behaved" utility functions, utility maximization requires a 
positive substitution effect. Since the dependent variable in our 
hours worked models is annual hours worked, we do not expect this 
to occur. 
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with wage rate changes in the latter. When wage rates increase, more 
people start to work. There is no income effect because there was no 
income (from own wages) prior to the decision to become a labor force 
participant. 
The following section discusses the specific form of the labor 
supply models we used. 
The Model 
Our objective is to investigate the effects of a number of different 
independent variables on labor supply. These variables can be loosely 
classified into three groups; demographic variables, economic variables, 
and health variables. In general form the model we use is the 
following: 
Labor supply = Age + 6^  Marital status + 3^  Race 
+ 3^  Education + Public transfers + Bg Wages 
+ 3, Asset income + 3^  Family transfers 
f O 
+ 3g Nonrespondent income + 3j^ q Rural residence 
+ Health variables. 
The demographic variables in the model are age, race and marital 
status.^  In other works [9, 11] age has been found to be negatively 
related to labor supply. Reasons for this may be related to declines 
in productivity due to increases in age and/or the increasing incidence 
H^ e classify education and rural residence as economic variables 
for reasons discussed below. 
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of ill health as one ages. Conversely, Increasing age, up to some 
point, may represent increasing marginal productivity due to more 
years of experience. If wages are related to marginal productivity, 
an increase in the latter would cause an increase in the opportunity 
cost of not working. This suggests a positive relationship between 
age and labor supply, particularly for younger workers. Bowen and 
Finegan argue, however, that the relationship between age and labor 
force behavior "...certainly cannot be regarded as powerful..." 
[11, p. 72]. In spite of this uncertainty about the effect of age on 
labor supply, we include it as a continuous variable in our model 
because BJM [9] do. We also follow BJM [9] and divide the sample into 
"prime-age" subgroups (ages 25-54) and older subgroups (ages 55-64) 
to control for possible interaction between age and other independent 
variables in the model. 
Race is taken into account in the model by subsampling. The 
sample was divided into racial subsamples because of observed differences 
in the labor force behavior of blacks and whites [9, 11]. 
The marital status variable is included for two reasons. First, 
marriage may represent obligatory labor force activity for males 
because of the traditional attitude that husbands support their 
families. Second, there may be a relationship between marriage and 
personality disorders. That is, marital status may be a proxy for 
normal behavior which, for males, implies labor force participation 
[9, 11, p. 74]. For both these reasons, we expect a strong positive 
relationship between marital status and labor supply. 
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Economic variables include education, wages, other income 
variables and rural residence. Years of education is included as an 
economic variable because it represents a measure of the opportunity 
cost of not working [11, p. 58], Presumably, the better educated a 
person is, the more skills he possesses and therefore the higher is 
the wage he can earn if he works. Also education may serve as a proxy 
for motivation and talent [20]. For both of these reasons we expect 
a positive relationship between education and labor force behavior. 
We tested the model using two different wage variables; actual 
wages reported by the respondent, and reservation wages.^  Actual wages 
are expected to have a positive effect on labor force participation. 
The effect of wage offers on hours worked is uncertain. If the income 
effect of a change in wages dominates then hours worked changes in the 
opposite direction. If the substitution effect is strong, wage changes 
2 have a positive effect on hours worked. 
The reservation wage is the wage necessary to induce labor force 
participation. As such, increases in reservation wages are expected to 
have a negative effect on participation. The effect of a change in 
reservation wages on hours worked is ambiguous. If the actual wage is 
greater than the reservation wage and the latter increases, the change 
in the hours worked depends on the extent of the increase in reservation 
wages. As long as the actual wage is greater than the reservation wage, 
S^ee Chapter two for the derivation of reservation wages. 
2 
Ashenfelter and Heckman [3] find that for primary workers, the 
wage effects are small and insignificant. 
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we expect no change in hours worked. In addition, institutional 
constraints (particularly for primary workers) may not permit adjustment 
in labor force behavior by varying the number of hours worked.^  
The other income variables are asset income, public transfer 
payments, nonrespondent income (income earned by the spouse and by 
other household members), and family transfers which includes items 
such as alimony and regular contributions from nonhousehold members. 
These variables are expected to have a negative effect on labor force 
behavior because these sources of income can serve as substitutes for 
labor income. The inclusion of public transfers presents a problem in 
that often public transfers are forthcoming only if the recipient 
limits labor supply. Therefore the receipt of such transfers and the 
concomitant reduction in labor supply is a tautology. To control for 
this we follow BJM [9, p. 77] in eliminating from the sample those 
respondents who received (in 1971) Disability Insurance payments, 
Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled 
(DIABAPTD) because beneficiaries of these programs must severely 
restrict labor supply. To control for the endogeneity which may be 
inherent in the receipt of any public transfers, a second sample 
was also created which excluded recipients of any transfer payments. 
The rural residence variable is included as an economic variable 
because we view it as a proxy for labor market conditions. Regional 
information was unavailable in our data so we were unable to use 
T^his point applys to the relationship between actual wages and 
hours worked as well. 
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regional unemployment rates as BJM [9] did. Living in a rural environ­
ment may provide greater opportunities for home production and/or 
may represent limited employment opportunities. For these reasons we 
expect a negative coefficient for the rural variable. 
The Survey of Health and Work Characteristics questionnaire [34] asked 
respondents whether they had difficulty in performing a variety of 
functions. If they had difficulty in performing these functions, 
they were asked if they could perform them at all. The functions 
include reaching, walking, using stairs, stooping, lifting, speaking, 
hearing, and seeing. In addition, respondents were asked if they 
experienced mental or nervous disorders. For each of the first five 
functions listed above, two dummy variables were created. The first 
dummy has a value of 1 if the respondent reported difficulty performing 
the function, and 0 otherwise. The second dummy has a value of 1 if 
the respondent said he could not perform the function at all, and 0 
otherwise. The abilities to hear and speak were determined by inter­
viewer observation. The respondent was asked if he had difficulty 
seeing. If he responded affirmatively the seeing dummy was given a 
value of 1 and he was then asked if he had trouble seeing even with 
glasses. If the answer was yes, the seeing with glasses dummy was given 
a value of 1» The existence of mental and nervous disorders was 
ascertained by using a flash card listing various conditions and asking 
the respondent which conditions were a problem to him. 
We combined the health dummies listed above for use in the basic 
model in the following way. The dummy variables indicating difficulty 
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in or inability to reach were combined into one variable. The stooping, 
walking, using stairs variables were combined into one dummy as were 
the variables indicating difficulty seeing and difficulty seeing even 
with glasses. The other health variables were included as described 
above. 
There are several things to note about the health variables. 
First, the responses to the health variables were not medically 
verified. In the BJM discussion of the health variables, they note 
that a pretest sample with medical examinations indicate that people 
underestimate the existence and degree of severity of the reported 
limitation [9, p. 79]. Second, the limitations were not related to 
occupational requirements or to whether these limitations have an 
effect on the kind and amount of work the respondent can do. Thus 
there is not a tautological relationship between health and work 
effort. We expect a negative relationship between the health dummies 
and labor force behavior. 
Results 
The data 
The data used for the analysis are from the 1972 Survey of 
Disabled and Nondisabled Adults [29] and includes responses from 17,997 
persons, aged 20-64, 8633 of whom considered themselves disabled and 
9364 who did not. The disabled represent a population of 15.5 million 
persons and the nondisabled represent a population of 90.7 million 
persons [1]. From the total, we selected a number of cohorts to 
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conform to the BJM study [9]. We used a 20 percent subsample of males, 
aged 25-64. This sample was divided into race subsamples and further 
divided into age groups 25-54 and 55-64. From each of these age-race 
groups, persons who received transfers from Disability Insurance, 
Aid to the Blind, or Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled 
(DIABAPTD) were excluded for one set of regressions and persons receiving 
any public transfers were excluded for a second set. For each sample, 
we estimated both labor force participation and hours worked equations. 
. We tested four different models. First we used only the variables 
used in the BJM study [9]. Next we substituted reservation wages for 
actual wages. Then we tested an extended model using reservation wages, 
a larger number of health variables, more demographic variables, and 
more economic variables. Last, we tested the extended model using 
actual wages. The results for the first two models are presented in 
the next section.^  
The basic model 
Our hypothesis that the inclusion of health variables will not 
improve the explanatory power of labor supply models can be tested 
—2 by comparing the R of models without variables representing functional 
—2 limitations to the R of models including these variables. In general 
2 
our results support this hypothesis. For white males, in all 
A^ brief discussion of the results of the extended model is 
presented in Appendix C. 
S^ee Table 4. 
—2 Table 4. R of labor supply equations 
Labor force participation Hours worked 
Cohort No health Health No health Health 
1966* 1972^  1972^  1966* 1972^  1972^  1966* 1972^  1972^  1966* 1972^  1972^  
White males, aged 25-54, 
no DIABAPTD .24 .10 .10 .29 .09 .11 .20 .16 .08 .23 .18 .11 
White males, aged 25-54, 
no transfers .14 .10 .16 .17 .10 .18 - .13 .10 — .19 .14 
White males, aged 55-64, 
no DIABAPTD .32 .20 .09 .34 .19 .10 .38 .28 .07 .42 .30 .08 
White males, aged 55-64, 
no transfers .44 .17 .15 .51 .20 .15 - .27 .13 - .28 .14 
Black males, aged 25-54, 
no DIABAPTD .13 .31 .11 .33 .20 .03 .13 .08 .04 .19 .28 .17 
Black males, aged 25-54, 
no transfers .35 .24 .05 .45 .13 -.04 - .13 .17 - .24 .30 
Black males, aged 55-64, 
no DIABAPTD .40 .17 -.09 .51 .37 .25 .18 .07 .10 .40 .29 .22 
Black males, aged 55-64, 
no transfers .78 .10 -.06 .74 .19 .30 - .18 .18 - .26 .25 
*[9, pp. 101-106]. 
^[29] regressions were run using actual wages. 
[29] regressions were run using the same data base as In b but using reservation wages. 
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age-transfer payment subsamples, the addition of health variables 
—2 improved the R only by a small amount and even caused a decrease in 
—2 1 
R for two samples. Our results concur with the results obtained by 
BJM [9] for white males. 
BJM [9] found that in the labor force participation equation for 
young black males, who received no DIABAPTD and in the hours worked 
equation for old black males who received no transfers the addition 
—2 
of health variables caused the R to more than double. All four 
models we tested had similar results for the latter group. For the 
former group, however, three of the four models we tested resulted in 
—2 
a decrease in R when health variables were included. Our models show 
—2 
a large increase in the R in the hours worked equations for both age 
groups of black males who received no DIABAPTD and in the labor force 
participation equation of the older group. The no-transfer-payment 
subsample shows a similar pattern. For the older black males in both 
the no-transfers and no DIABAPTD subsamples and for both labor force 
participation and hours worked equations, and for young blacks in the 
hours worked equation, the hypothesis of no effect of health variables 
cannot be accepted. In the remainder of this section we discuss the 
2 impact of the independent variables on labor supply behavior. 
T^he two samples are both age groups of white males who received 
no DIABAPTD. 
2 See Tables 6-21 at the end of the chapter for the estimates of 
the coefficients of the Independent variables. 
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Demographic variables 
The basic model contains three demographic variables, marital 
status, age and race. Race is taken into account by subsampling 
and racial differences, where they exist, will be noted throughout 
the discussion. The marital status variable is expected to have a 
significant positive effect on labor supply, especially for the 
participation decision. BJM [9, pp. 90-91] hypothesize that the 
importance of the marital status variable may be associated with its 
relationship to health variables when analyzing the labor force 
behavior of persons who consider themselves disabled. In four of the 
eight labor force participation equations the marital status coefficient 
is significant and positive in the BJM analysis. In addition, for 
these four cohorts, the size of the coefficient decreases when health 
variables are included in the model, which supports their hypothesis. 
For the hours worked equations, however, this pattern is not repeated, 
although the marital status coefficient is positive and significant 
for two of the four cohorts for which BJM present results [9, pp. 101-106], 
In general, our results agree with the BJM [9] results although 
more weakly. In the labor force participation equations, the marital 
status coefficient was significant and positive for two of the eight 
cohorts when we used actual wages and three when we used reservation 
wages. For young black males who received no transfers, the inclusion 
of health variables caused the marital status coefficient to decrease 
and become insignificant. For young black males who received no 
DIABAPTD, however, the addition of health variables had no effect on 
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the significance of the marital status variable. These results occur 
when we use actual wages. When using reservation wages, the health model 
does not reduce the coefficient of marital status in two of the three 
samples where it was significant. For older white males, however, the 
coefficient becomes nonsignificant when the health model is used. 
For the hours worked equations the marital status coefficient is 
nonsignificant for all cohorts, whether actual or reservation wages 
were used. When actual wages were used, the signs of the coefficient 
are positive except in the conventional model for old white males who 
received no transfers. There is no discernible pattern to the change in 
the marital status coefficient when health variables are added. When 
reservation wages are used, the signs of the coefficients for the 
white samples are negative and positive for black samples. 
BJM suggest that much of the hypothesized association between 
health and marital status is due to the variable representing mental 
disorders [9, pp. 90-91]. Our results provide two pieces of evidence 
to support this. First, for young black males receiving no DIABAPTD 
in the hours worked equation using actual wages, the mental disorder 
dummy is large, negative and significant at the 5 percent level and 
the marital status coefficient falls from 622.1547 in the conventional 
model to 6.3109 in the health model. Second, in the labor force 
participation equation for old white males receiving no DIABAPTD when 
we use reservation wages, the mental disorder dummy again is significant, 
and when health variables are included the marital status variable 
becomes insignificant. 
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BJM argue that the existence of functional limitations affects 
blacks more than whites in terms of labor force behavior. The evidence 
they cite is that "...the explanatory power of the health models 
(relative to the conventional form) is from four to five times as great 
for the black cohorts" [9, p. 92]. If the comparison they are making 
is between black and white subsamples in terms of percentage changes 
—2 in R after the health variables are added then in two of four cases 
for labor force participation and in both cases for hours worked then 
1 
their results bear them out. But in only two cases is there a 
—2 
particularly large change in R with the addition of measures of 
functional limitations. When we make the same comparisons using our 
results, a different pattern emerges. 
In the participation equations the health models have more 
explanatory power for blacks than for whites only in the older black 
groups. For the younger groups, the inclusion of health variables 
—2 
causes R to decrease indicating that the addition of these variables 
has no value in explaining the variation among the respondents. In 
the hours worked equations, the health models explain black labor supply 
behavior better than for their white counterparts in three of four com-
—2 parisons. The largest changes in R occur in the participation equations 
of older black males and the hours worked equations of blacks who do 
not receive DIABAPTD (both age groups). These results suggest the 
response of younger black males to ill health is in the form of a 
S^ee Table 5. 
—2 
Table 5. Percentage change in R when health variables are added to a conventional model of labor 
supply 
1966^  1972^  1972*^  
LFP IffiS LFP HRS LFP HRS 
Black White Black White Black White Black White Black White Black White 
Males, aged 25-54, 
no DIABAPTD 
Males, aged 25-54, 
no transfers 
Males, aged 55-64, 
no DIABAPTD 
Males, aged 55-64, 
no transfers 
138% 21% 46% 
29% 21% 
28% 6% 122% 
-5% 17% 
15% -35% -10% 
-46% 0 
12.5% 118% -5% 
90% 18% 
250% 13% -73% 
85% 46% -180% 
314% 7% 378% 
44% 4% 600% 
10% 325% 38% 
13% 76% 40% 
11% 120% 14% 
0 39% 8% 
C^alculated using results reported in [9, pp. 101-106]. 
[^29]. Regressions were run using actual wages. 
*"[29]. Regressions were run using reservation wages. 
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reduction in hours worked rather than in withdrawal from the labor 
force while older black males who receive no transfers respond by not 
working. The reasons for these differences in labor force response 
may be due to differences between blacks and whites caused by discrimina­
tion. We are somewhat suspicious of the large effect of health, 
particularly on older black males, because of the small and therefore 
less reliable samples. 
Age is included in our models in two ways; the samples were 
divided into age groups, and age was included as a continuous variable 
in each of the samples. Labor force participation rates for males 
fall as age goes up [39]. For example, 1973 participation rates were: 
Age Rate 
25-34 96% 
35-44 96% 
45-54 93% 
55-64 78% 
BJM get similar results from the data on impaired males in 1965 [9, p. 93]. 
Cohort 
did not receive DIABAPTD Rate 
White, 25-54 91% 
White, 55-64 76% 
Black, 25-54 88% 
Black, 55-64 78% 
They point out that participation rates for white males are more sensi­
tive to being in the older age group than arc blacks as evidenced by 
the change in sign from positive to negative and the significance of 
the constant term as one goes from the younger to the older age groups. 
The same result is not found for the hours worked models [9, p. 94]. 
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Because of the decrease in participation rates as males age, BJM 
[9] expect a negative relationship between the continuous variable age 
and both participation decisions and number of hours worked. Their 
results bear them out with one glaring exception. They find that an 
additional year of age increases the probability of labor force 
participation in the older white samples [9, p. 94].^  
The labor force participation rate for our impaired samples show 
a different pattern. 
These results may be due to the fact that we used a 20 percent subsample 
from the 1972 Survey of Disabled and Nondisabled Adults. The striking 
difference is between the black and white cohorts which is not observed 
in the population as a whole but which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that ill health has a larger effect on the black group. 
Our results indicate more sensitivity to age in the participation 
equations for blacks than whites for both transfer payment subsamples 
They offer an explanation of this result which hypothesizes that 
age is a proxy for survival for these groups. That is, the sample 
does not include institutionalized persons and older people are more 
likely to have illnesses which require institutionalization and thus 
not be included in the sample. In addition, the 55-64 age group 
(in 1965) may be smaller than normal because some of its members were 
killed in World War II. The sample, therefore, is subject to sample 
selection bias, the consequences of which are not known. These 
"survivors" may have more commitment to the labor force and/or less 
willingness to succumb to age [9, p. 95]. 
Cohort Rate 
White, 25-54 
White, 55-64 
Black, 25-54 
Black, 55-64 
88.5 
90.9 
75.6 
68.4 
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when actual wages are used. That is, the regressions for the younger 
age group of black males have significant positive coefficients on the 
constant term and the older black males have negative constant terms. 
This may be due to the different participation rates of our sample. 
In the BJM samples, participation decreases by 15 percentage points 
as white males age and 10 percentage points as black males age. In 
our sample, participation rates increase for whites but decrease for 
blacks. 
The marginal effect of the continuous age variable is in most 
cases not significantly different from zero. There are, however, 
several pieces of evidence which support the hypothesis that the effect 
of age on labor force behavior is associated with impairments. In the 
hours worked equation for older white males who receive no transfers, 
the inclusion of health variables results in a more negative and 
now-significant coefficient of the age variable. This suggests that the 
existence of poor health exacerbates the reduction in hours worked as 
members of this group age. For young black males who receive no DIABAPTD, 
however, the addition of health variables causes the coefficient of the 
age variable to become less negative and now, nonsignificant in the 
labor force participation equation. For this group, the reduction in 
participation seemingly imduGed by aging may be due to ill health. 
In both cases, there is an apparent relationship between health and 
age. 
Our results do not exhibit the positive relationship between 
age and participation for older white males. For older black males 
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who receive no DIABAPTD we do get this anomalous result. The addition 
of health variables in this model increases the coefficient of the age 
variable and causes it to become significant. We have no insights as to 
why we get this result but again, age and health are related. 
Economic variables 
The basic model includes wages, education, and other income 
variables as economic variables. We tested the model using two 
different measures of wages; reported wages and reservation wages 
calculated as described in Chapter 2. The reservation wage results 
were disappointing. In only two cases did they perform better 
_2 (in terms of R ) than using actual wages. They did as well as actual 
wages in only four cases. The reason for this may be that some of 
the independent variables in the labor supply equation are also in 
the reservation wage equation. For example, the marital status 
variable is in both equations. Some of the effect of marital status 
on labor supply may be felt through the reservation wage variable, 
diluting the magnitude of the effect of both on labor supply. As 
was pointed out in the previous chapter, however, the use of reservation 
wages removes the bias that results from using truncated samples and 
therefore is statistically valid. In addition, reservation wage 
seems to be the theoretically more correct variable to use, particularly 
in the participation regressions. 
BJM [9] find that wages have a significant positive effect on 
participation and a significant negative effect on hours worked for 
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all the white cohorts. Our results using actual wages are the same. 
These results are consistent with labor supply theory. The effect of 
an increase in wages on participation is positive because there is 
no income effect. The effect of a wage increase on hours worked 
depends on the relative strengths of the income and substitution 
effectsw These results imply that the income effect dominates. 
However, these results do not agree with previous work on labor supply 
behavior of primary workers [3]. The response to changes in wages of 
both participation and hours worked for prime age males has been 
found to be insignificant and small. Secondary workers have been 
found to have large positive labor supply responses to changes in 
wages [3]. The implication of this is that white males who consider 
themselves disabled behave more like secondary workers instead of 
primary workers. As wages go up, more enter the labor force, and vice 
versa. This result suggests that disabled persons may respond to 
economic conditions and supports the hypothesis that it is the inter­
action of health with other characteristics that determines an 
individual's disability status.^  
The positive effect of wages on participation and the negative 
effect on hours worked is repeated in the black cohorts when actual 
wages are used but less strongly. For black males who receive no 
Bayo and Wilkin [5] point out that prevailing wage rates may 
have a strong influence on application rates for health related 
transfer payment programs such as DI. 
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transfer payments (both age groups), in the participation equations, 
the addition of health variables results in a loss of significance for 
the coefficient for wages. This suggests that there is some association 
between ill health and actual wages for these groups. Some of the 
variation in participation which appears to be explained by differences 
in actual wages, may be due to differences in impairments among 
respondents. 
The reservation wage variable is significant and negative in the 
participation equation for older white males who receive no transfers 
and in the hours worked equations for both age groups. The only 
black group for which the variable is significant is in the health 
version of the participation equation for older black males who receive 
no transfer payments. The positive sign is puzzling because we expect 
an increase in reservation wages to reduce participation. The 
reason for this result may be that the reservation wage equation for 
black males is not very satisfying as we pointed out in Chapter 2. 
In addition, the small sample size makes the results less reliable. 
BJM [9] expect the education variable to be positive and 
significant only when labor markets are imperfect; that is, when wages 
do not reflect the marginal productivity of workers. Their results 
for the participation equation support their expectations in that the 
education variable is insignificant except in the health model for 
younger black males who receive no DIABAPTD. They argue that for this 
group differences in education reflect differences in marginal 
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productivity that is not captured by wages and therefore has a signifi­
cant effect on participation. They suggest the reason this applies 
to the black group is because of discrimination [9, pp. 97-98]. 
Our results are not consistent with the above hypothesis. The 
education variable is significant and positive for prime-age white 
males using both actual and reservation wages in the participation and 
hours worked equations and insignificant for all black groups. These 
results are consistent with Bowen and Finegan's 1969 research [11]. 
They expect a positive relationship between education and participation 
in general because "...the opportunity cost-of staying out of the 
labor market is greater for a person with considerable education 
than for a person with relatively little education" [11, p. 53]. 
Bowen and Finegan [11] also find a relatively high participation rate 
for black males who have relatively fewer years of education. They 
explain this result by pointing out that "...because of a more random 
selection procedure, this group [who have fewer years of education 
and higher participation rates] contains a relatively large proportion 
of Individuals with considerable innate ability, drive, and so on" 
[11, p. 57]. In other words, members of this group are labor force 
participants in spite of a lower educational attainment.^  
Bowen and Finegan [11» pp. 63-54] also report a strong relationship 
between physical limitations and education and the effect of these 
T^he sign and lack of significance of the education coefficient 
is consistent with results we obtained when we estimated reservation 
wages in Chapter 2. 
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characteristics on labor force participation. They show that if the 
sample is divided into two groups, one consisting of people who have 
no activity limitations and one of people who do, the observed increase 
in participation as years of education increase disappears for the 
former group. This may be because people with fewer years of education 
have fewer job opportunities available to them and thus are unable to 
adjust to health problems by changing jobs, so they drop out of the 
labor force. Ill health is a stronger deterrent to participation for 
the poorly educated. We would expect then, that the education 
variable would be significant for those people who considered themselves 
disabled. For younger white males, this is the case. For older white 
males and black males the education variable is insignificant. Perhaps 
by the time a white male reaches age 55, his opportunity set is not 
defined so much by the amount of education he has but by his experience, 
seniority, etc. For black males of all ages, the types of jobs 
available may be limited more by discrimination than lack of education. 
The rationale for analyzing transfer payment subsamples is twofold. 
First, because the receipt of some types of transfer payments (e.g. DI) 
is conditioned on restricted labor supply, we want to exclude those 
respondents from the sample. Second, we want to see if the labor 
supply response of people who receive some types of transfer payments 
(e.g. veteran's benefits) is different (lower) than those respondents 
who receive no transfer payments. If the latter is true, then the 
concern over the disincentive effects of transfer payments is warranted. 
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BJM [9, pp. 98-99] find that for prime-age whites and older 
blacks, the participation rates of the no-transfer group is significantly 
higher. In addition, the public transfer variable is significant 
in the participation for all race-age subsamples and in all but the 
younger black sample for the hours worked equations. 
Our results do not support the disincentive hypothesis so 
strongly. 
No DIABAPTD No transfers 
rate rate 
White, aged 25-54 86.7 88.5 
Black, aged 25-54 70.5 75.6 
White, aged 55-64 87.2 90.9 
Black, aged 55-64 69.6 68.4 
Although participation rates increase for all groups except for older 
black males, the increases are marginal. The coefficient of public 
transfers is insignificant for all black groups. It is significant 
only in the participation equation for older white males and in the 
hours worked equations for both age groups. 
The relationship between other income variables and labor supply 
is hypothesized to be negative and BJM*s results support this expecta­
tion. For all but two regressions, one or more of the three other 
income variables is significant and negative. Older white males' 
participation decisions are significantly related to all three other 
income variables. Our results are very different. In only one 
participation regression (older white males who receive no DIABAPTD) 
is another income variable significantly negative. Younger white 
males show a significant positive relationship between asset income 
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and hours worked. Apparently the asset income variable represents 
different things to different age groups. Older males appear to view 
it as a substitute for labor income while for younger males it represents 
a proxy for labor force commitment. An explanation for the latter result 
may be that asset income is a proxy for an individual's taste for work. 
People who are highly motivated to earn income may acquire more assets 
and thus have more asset income than those less motivated to work.^  
Labor force participation is the norm for males, especially 
prime-age males. It may be that the availability of other income, 
especially in relatively small amounts, does not outweigh the social 
pressure to have a job. 
Health variables 
Although we have noted the relationship between health and the other 
independent variables where applicable in our discussion of the other 
independent variables, in this section we discuss specific results. 
In the participation regressions for white males» the types of limita­
tions which have significant coefficients are mental in nature rather 
than physical. The opposite holds true for the black samples. The 
limitation variable which was most frequently significant for whites 
was the presence of nervous disorders while for blacks, it was 
stooping, walking, or using stairs limitations. If blacks typically 
T^his point is strengthened when the extended model, which also 
includes a variable representing net value of assets, is tested. The 
results show that the coefficient of the net value of assets is 
positive and significant. See Appendix C for further discussion of 
this point. 
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have more physically demanding jobs than do whites, this result is 
not surprising. 
The hours worked equations for the younger age groups show a 
surprising result. The hearing limitation dummy has a significant 
positive coefficient. This may be a statistical artifact due to the 
way in which the variable was measured. The interviewer coded the 
respondent as having difficulty hearing by observation only. We have 
no way of knowing whether this meant that the respondent wore a 
hearing aid or whether the interview was conducted in sign language! 
On the other hand, people with a severe hearing loss are eligible for 
public programs which may provide them with training and/or motivation 
that they otherwise would not receive, resulting in a stronger labor 
force attachment than people with other functional limitations. In 
subsequent surveys we would like to see a better measure of "has 
difficulty hearing" in order to investigate its effect on labor 
supply. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The regression results using 1971 data are, in general, not as 
good as the results from 1965 data if goodness of fit is determined 
—2 by the R . In only one case in the labor force participation regres-
—2 
sions is the R higher for 1971 data than for 1965 and in some cases 
—2 the R is much lower. A similar pattern appears in the hours worked 
equations although the model does better overall. Perhaps the reason 
for the difference is a difference in the definition of disability used 
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in the two surveys. BJM [9, p. 8] defined disability as being unable 
to work or limited in the kind and/or amount of work one could do 
that lasted for six months or longer. The 1972 survey [29] defined 
disability as above except that the duration of the limitation lasted 
three months.^  Our samples consisted of people who had been disabled 
(as defined above) for a shorter period of time than the BJM samples. 
This may mean that our samples contained people who were less severely 
2 disabled than the 1965 samples. 
Our results support the hypothesis that functional limitations, 
by themselves, do not explain a great deal of the variation in labor 
force behavior of impaired white males. The hypothesis is not 
supported for black males. The addition of health variables causes 
—2 
a large increase in R in all the hours worked regressions and in the 
participation regressions for older black males. In the participation 
equations for younger black males, the health model does a poorer job 
of explanation. These results suggest that younger black males are 
B^JM [9, p. 9] argue that there is some evidence that people who 
have been disabled for between four to six months and people who 
have been disabled seven months or longer are not very different 
groups. 
2 
We tested the models described in this chapter using samples of 
jûâles who did not consider themselves disabled. The regressions for 
]^ abor force participation for the nondisabled had a much smaller 
R . This suggests that the models are not very useful in predicting 
labor force participation of nondisabled people. The participation 
rates of these groups were quite high which indicates there was 
little variation in the sample. 
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more like their white counterparts. The participation decision is the 
more fundamental labor supply decision for prime-age males. The 
presence of limitations would seem to have less of an effect on this 
decision than on the number of hours worked. Younger black males 
adjust hours worked in response to health problems but not participation. 
This seems reasonable if blacks are over-represented in unskilled 
occupations where hours are more flexible. 
The hypothesis that ill health interacts with other independent 
variables in explaining labor supply behavior is supported by our 
results. In particular, there is some evidence that there is a 
relationship between mental disorders and marital status. That is, the 
more likely a person is to have mental disorders, the less likely he 
is to be married and the less likely he is to be a labor force 
participant. The observed large positive relationship between marital 
status and participation is not due to marriage per se but to the 
mental health of the participant. 
The effect of age on labor supply behavior also seems to be 
related to health. The observed negative effect of age on labor 
supply may be strengthened by the existence of impairments for older 
males. For younger males, the negative effect of age on labor supply 
may be due to health problems rather than aging itself. 
The results support the hypothesis that some of the effect of 
education on participation is due to poor health for prime-age white 
males. Participation rates for disabled persons are expected to be 
more sensitive to differences in education than for the nondisabled. 
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The education variable is significant in the participation regressions 
for younger white males who considered themselves disabled. When the 
same model is tested using a sample of nondisabled white males, the 
education variable is not significantly different from zero. 
The exclusion of recipients of transfer payments when the receipt 
of such payments requires a reduction in labor supply is justified. 
It appears, from our results, however, that the exclusion of recipients 
of all transfer payments provides little additional information. 
The participation rates of the two groups is only marginally different 
—2 
and the R and significant independent variables are similar for both 
samples. The cost of excluding transfer payment recipients is a 
reduction in sample size which may be quite high in the older black 
groups. 
We were disappointed with the results when we tested the model 
using reservation wages. In general, the reservation wage models 
did no better and in some cases did a poorer job in explaining labor 
force behavior than models using the actual wage. The only exceptions 
were in the participation regression for younger white males who 
received no transfers and the health version of the hours worked model 
for older black males who received no transfers. The pattern differs 
between racial groups, however. The reservation wage models do just 
about as well as actual wage models in predicting participation of 
white males. For black males, actual wages do a better job. This 
may be because the estimate of reservation wages for white males is 
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more reasonable in terms of the size and sign of the coefficients than 
the estimate for black males. In future research we would like to 
improve the reservation wage model for black males. 
Our results concur with the BJM [9] results and support the 
hypothesis that functional limitations alone do not result in a reduced 
labor supply but interact with other economic and demographic 
characteristics to determine labor force behavior. 
Table 6. Labor force participation, white males aged 25-54, 
households receiving DIABAPTD excluded 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
g t 6 t 
Age -.0370 3.29* -.0038 3.03* 
Education -.0016 0.55 -.0029 1.00 
Asset income +.0006 8.71* +.0004 .60 
Family transfers -.0189 0.83 -.0212 3.36 
Public transfers -.0077 3.06* -.0063 7.11* 
Nonrespondent income +.0004 0.76 +.0003 0.68 
Marital status +.1616 5.98* +.1232 4.54* 
Rural residence/UE -.0452 0.42 -.0377 0.35 
Hourly wages +.4524 8.66* +.4148 8.10* 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -.0700 0.91 
Reaching limitations - - -.0156 1.17 
Lifting limitations - - -.0714 3.88* 
Sensory limitations - — +.0150 0.83 
Speech - - -.1972 3.31* 
Hearing - - +.0160 0.42 
Mental disorders - - -.1914 3.06* 
Nervous disorders - - -.7589 1.36 
Constant +.8697 11.10* +.9568 11.83* 
R2 
.24 - .29 -
N 751 - 751 -
*[9]. 
[^29]. 
S^ignificant at the 5% level. 
Independent 
variable 
68 
1971 results using actual wages^  
No health Health No health Health 
-.0021 1.01 -.0017 0.76 +.0018 0. 66 +.0009 0.32 
+.0131 2.36* +.0137 2.42* +.0246 4. 36* +.0225 3.90* 
-.000005 0.37 -.000004 0.31 -.000004 0. 24 -.000003 0.22 
-.00008 0.62 -.0001 0.68 -.0001 0. 77 -.0001 0.87 
-.000004 0.26 +.000002 0.10 +.00004 1. 14 +.00004 0.94 
-.0000005 0.01 +.000002 0.39 -.000003 0. 65 - 0.00 
+.0504 1.01 +.0520 1.02 +.1279 2. ,11* +.1355 2.23* 
+.0349 0.81 +.0505 1.13 -.0058 0. ,12 +.0218 0.43 
+.0200 4.90* +.0193 4.64* -.0405 1. ,39 -.0271 0.92 
M -
-.0499 1.27 - - -.0585 1.40 
-
-
-.0290 0.61 - - -.0444 0.90 
-
-
-.0067 0.17 - - -.0195 0.47 
- - +.0119 0.31 - - +.0390 0.95 
-
- +.0203 0.17 - - -.1461 1.40 
-
- +.0186 0.24 - - +.0476 0.60 
- - +.0562 0.84 - - +.0115 0.17 
- -
-.1807 2.10* - - -.2014 2.25* 
+.7128 6.22* +.7148 6.08* +.3986 3 .15* +.4950 3.68* 
.10 - .09 - .10 - .11 -
305 - 305 - 315 - 315 -
Table 7. Labor force participation, white males aged 55-64, 
households receiving DIABAPTD excluded 
Independent 
variable 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
3 t e t 
Age +.0295 4.26* +.0268 3.84* 
Education -.0026 0.54 -.0030 0.62 
Asset income -.0059 7.66* -.0058 7.57* 
Family transfers 
-.0700 5.58* -.0520 2.42* 
Public transfers -.0115 7.12* -.0106 6.38* 
Nonrespondent income —« 0049 4.75* -.0046 4.51* 
Marital status +.0740 1.45 +.0775 1.49 
Rural residence/UE -.0964 0.46 -.1158 0.55 
Hourly wages +.4728 5.86* +.4683 5.77* 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -.1648 1.05 
Reaching limitations - - -.0306 1.36 
Lifting limitations - - -.0393 1.24 
Sensory limitations - - -.0105 0.23 
Speech -
- - -
Hearing - -
- -
Mental disorders - -
-.2223 0.90 
Nervous disorders - -
-.1414 1.86 
Constant -.9431 2.19* -.7029 -
.32 - .34 -
N 418 - 418 -
[^9]. 
[^29]. 
S^ignificant at the 5% level. 
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TO-J1  ^ T b 1971 results using 1971 results using actual wages .^ î 
reservation wages^  
No health Health No health Health 
-.0114 1.22 -.0137 1.41 -.0137 1.12 -.0191 1.50 
+.0078 0.81 +.0064 0.62 +.0168 1.42 +.0154 1.22 
-.00004 2.30* -.00003 2.20* -.00002 1.39 -.00002 1.45 
+.0001 0.66 +.0001 0.65 +.00006 0.62 +.00006 0.55 
-.00004 2.88* -.00004 2.73* -.0001 1.49 -.0001 1.53 
-.000001 0.11 +.000004 0.22 +.000002 0.25 +.000004 0.56 
+.1212 1.64 +.0925 1.18 +.2125 2.25* +.1873 1.88 
+.0230 0.35 +.0114 0.17 +.0664 0.86 +.0499 0.64 
+.0287 4.04* +.0260 3.52* +.0379 0.69 +.0456 0.80 
- - +.0024 0.03 - - +.0301 0.44 
- - +.0043 0.05 - - -.0253 0.33 
- - +.0204 0.32 - - +.0003 0.01 
- - -.0765 1.35 - - -.1093 1.86 
- - -.0888 0.60 - - -.0955 0,61 
- - -.0470 0.61 - - -.0696 0.87 
- - -.1935 1.67 - - -.2410 2.00* 
- - +.0195 0.17 - - +.0073 0.06 
1.2994 2.31* 1.5271 2.58* 1.3582 2.02* 1.7720 2.54* 
.20 - .19 - .09 - .10 -
132 - 132 - 133 - 133 -
Table 8. Labor force participation, white males aged 25-54, 
households receiving any transfers excluded 
Independent 
variable 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
B t B 
Age -.0025 2.31* -.0031 2.51* 
Education +.0009 0.31 +.0006 0.18 
Asset income -.0004 0.16 -.0009 0.35 
Family transfers -.0194 3.54* -.0210 3.87* 
Nonrespondent income +.0001 0.18 +.0037 0.08 
Marital status +.1361 4.86* +.1066 3.75* 
Rural residence/UE -.0303 0.28 -.0513 0.48 
Hourly wages +.2324 3.97* +.2061 3.52* 
Stooping, walking limitations - - .0191 0.23 
Reaching limitations - - -.0167 1.12 
Lifting limitations - - -.0421 2.05* 
Sensory limitations - - +.0208 1.16 
Speech - - - -
Hearing - - - -
Mental disorders - - -.2815 3.62 
Nervous disorders - - +.0015 0.04 
Constant +.8847 11.61* +.9567 12.04* # .14 - .17 -
N 436 — 436 — 
*[9]. 
[^29]. 
^Significant at the 5% level. 
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1971 results using actual wages^  results usin| 
reservation wages'^  
No health Health No health Health 
-.0039 1.78 -.0036 1.56 -.0021 0.78 -.0037 1.35 
+.0098 1.70 +.0118 2.00* +.0235 4.08* +.0225 3.66* 
-.00001 0.72 -.00001 0.77 -c00001 0.74 -.00001 0.83 
-.00008 0.70 -.00009 0.78 -.0001 0.78 -.0001 1.06 
-.00001 1.66 -.00001 1.11 -.00001 1.91 -.00001 1.04 
+.0804 1.55 +.0722 1.36 +.2258 3.70* +.2218 3.62* 
+.0370 0.82 +.0432 0.93 +.0241 0.47 +.0459 0.88 
+.0149 3.53* +.0133 3.10* -.0048 0.29 +.0112 0.67 
- - +.0205 0.50 - - +.0023 0.05 
- - -.0356 0.71 - - -.0619 1.13 
- - +.0144 0.35 - - -.0014 0.03 
-
- +.0268 0.67 - - +.0591 1.35 
-
- +.0997 0.83 - - -.1557 1.39 
-
- -.0175 0.23 - - +.0350 0.42 
- - +.0651 0.85 - - -.0087 0.11 
-
- -.2312 2.41* - - -.2732 2.59* 
+.8711 7.28* +.8271 6.69* +.5637 4.56* .6565 4.84* 
.10 - .10 - .16 - .18 -
207 - 207 - 216 — 216 -
Table 9. Labor force participation, white males aged 55-64, 
households receiving any public transfers excluded 
Independent 
variable 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
3 t ê t 
Age +.0209 2.26* +.0143 1.58 
Education -.0061 1.06 -.0074 1.33 
Asset income -.0066 7.97* -.0061 8.32* 
Family transfers -.0864 5.76* -.1643 3.75* 
Nonrespondent income -.0064 5.19* -.0063 5.33* 
Marital status +.1913 2.79* +.1807 2.73* 
Rural residence/UE -.1486 0.54 -.3114 1.17 
Hourly wages +.2373 2.50* +.2275 2.50* 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -.2214 1.14 
Reaching limitations - - -.0915 2.29* 
Lifting limitations - - -.0171 0.40 
Sensory limitations - — +.0632 1.09 
Speech - - - -
Hearing - - - -
Mental disorders - - +.7746 1.74 
Nervous disorders - - -.0473 0.55 
Constant 
# 
-.3843 0.68 +.1223 0.22 
.44 - .51 -
N 187 187 — 
*[9]. 
[^29]. 
^Significant at the 5% level. 
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1971 results using actual wages^  1971 results 
reservation 
using 
wages" 
No health Health No health Health 
I t B t ê t I t 
-.0227 2.49* -.0242 2.62* -.0066 0.60 -.0099 0.97 
+.0018 0.18 -.0066 0.62 -.0037 0.36 -.0082 0.75 
-.00001 1.01 -.00002 1.23 +.000005 0.39 - -
+.000005 0.60 +.00008 0.80 +.00004 0.42 +.00006 0.62 
+.000001 0.24 +.000002 0.41 +.000001 0.23 +.000003 0.52 
+.1557 1.92 +.1082 1.28 +.0928 1.05 +.0563 0.59 
+.0286 0.44 +.0131 0.20 +.0111 0.16 -.0044 0.06 
+.0264 3.27* +.0276 3.37* -.0731 2.92* -.0677 2.58* 
- - -.0458 0.70 - - +.0079 0.12 
- - +.0964 1.32 - - +.0592 0.81 
-
- -.0495 0.76 - - -.0517 0.80 
- - -.1287 2.22* - - -.0994 1.64 
- - -.1199 0.91 - - -.1077 0.81 
- +.1322 1.73 - - +.1146 1.47 
- — -.1803 1.23 - - -.2583 1.74 
-
-
-.0177 0.16 - - -.0612 0.55 
1.9999 3.60* 2.2783 4.00* 1.2556 2.19* 1.6046 2.67 
.17 - .20 - .15 - .15 -
98 - 98 - 99 - 99 -
Table 10. Hours worked, white males aged 55-64, households 
receiving DIABAPTD excluded 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
ê t B t 
Age -.0034 2. 46* -.0031 2.25* 
Education +.0058 5. 96* +.0055 5.72* 
Asset income +.0009 1. 54 +.0008 1.49 
Family transfers -.0512 3. 07* -.0628 3.81* 
Public transfers -.0030 8. 00* -.0026 7.00* 
Nonrespondent income -.0001 0. 23 -.0001 0.08 
Marital status +.0263 2. 48* +.0338 3.11* 
Rural residence/UE -.0016 0. 38 -.0239 0.92 
Hourly wages -.0052 3. 30* -.0049 3.21* 
Stooping, walking limitations 
Reaching limitations - - -.0034 2.36* 
Lifting limitations - - -.0069 1.15 
Sensory limitations - - -.0145 1.58 
Speech - - +.0085 0.41 
Hearing - - +.0252 2.14* 
Mental disorders - - - -
Nervous disorders - - +.0102 0.66 
Constant 
5% 
+.3207 3. 73* +.3305 3.91* 
.38 - .42 -
N 240 - 240 -
*[9]. 
1^29]. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
Independent 
variable 
76 
1971 results using actual wages 
No health Health 
1971 results using 
reservation wages 
No health Health 
-41.4548 2.09* -41.0696 2.05* -42.4318 1.39 -25.2256 0.78 
+34.5822 1.61 +21.7308 0.98 +14.6830 0.51 -9.3432 0.30 
+.0429 1.13 +.0566 1.48 -.0051 0.12 -.0041 0.10 
-.1700 0.80 -.2453 1.06 -.1552 0.64 -.1862 0.70 
-.1153 2.39* -.1126 2.34* -.0304 0.16 +.0726 0.36 
-.0193 1.46 -.0124 0.91 -.0264 1.75 -.0196 1.26 
+176.2551 1.02 +191.8281 1.06 -40.3066 0.16 -162.1517 0.62 
+256.1379 1.89 +228.1471 1.66 +174.2759 0.98 +121.6638 0.67 
-82.6833 5.42* -85.2878 5.53* -57.7273 0.41 -137.2642 0.90 
-
-
-287.9083 2.13* - - -407.8812 2,58* 
-
-
-192.9455 1.23 - - -39.8471 0.22 
-
-
-26.5257 0.20 - - +35.9035 0.24 
-
-
-55.5874 0.45 - - +.9982 0.01 
- - +186.7053 0.59 - - +116.0213 0.32 
- - +49.7818 0.30 - - +135.0202 0.71 
- -
-4.5291 0.02 - - +45.9456 0.15 
- - +21.0946 0.09 - - +97.0630 0.34 
+4236.2597 3.59* +4556.0642 3.77* +4377.0533 2.72* +3912.5382 2.30* 
.28 - .30 - .07 - .08 -
112 - 112 - 112 - 112 -
Table 11. Hours worked, white males aged 25-54, households 
receiving DIABAPTD excluded 
Independent 
variable 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
ê t 3 t 
Age -.0001 0.31 +.0001 0.16 
Education +.0051 7.26* +.0053 7.51* 
Asset income +.0002 1.45 +.0002 1.13 
Family transfers -.0059 2.52* -.0059 2.47* 
Public transfers -.0016 6.54* -.0015 6.35* 
Nonrespondent income -.0005 4.00* -.0005 3.82* 
Marital status +.0417 5.62* +.0466 6.24* 
Rural residence/UE -.0048 1.83 -.0045 1.73 
Hourly wages -.0029 2.19* -.0033 2.44* 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -.0565 2.94 
Reaching limitations - - +.0037 0.97 
Lifting limitations - - -.0036 0.74 
Sensory limitations - - +.0017 0.38 
Speech — - +.0623 3.55* 
Hearing - - -.0022 0.24 
Mental disorders - - - -
Nervous disorders - - -.0211 1.82 
Constant 
T 
+.1295 6.71* +.1216 6.08* 
.20 - .23 -
N 
*[9]. 
[^29], 
^Significant at the 5% level. 
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1971 results using actual wages 
No health Health 
1971 results using 
reservation wages 
No health Health 
+2.1925 0.42 +3.367 0.62 +3.4603 0.50 +4.8260 0.68 
+70.1256 4.88* +75.4252 5.25* +55.3911 3.70* +60.9115 4.06* 
+.0824 2.24* +.0802 2.18* +.0967 2.48* +.0892 2.30* 
-.0227 0.07 -.1338 0.43 -.1221 0.38 -.2672 0.81 
-.1077 2.67* -.1057 2.62* +.0015 0.02 -.0099 0.10 
-.0147 1.23 -.0100 0.82 -.0105 0.84 -.0060 0.48 
+146.2605 1.12 +98.1414 0.75 -18.8435 0.12 -59.8203 0.37 
+173.3518 1.60 +249.8020 2.26* +116.9741 0.96 +220.7972 1.76 
-51.9485 5.13* -50.4184 4.98* -92.8070 1,29 -82.1137 1.13 
- -
-159.3471 1.66 - - -158.3524 1.58 
- -
-174.7324 1.49 - - -156.0634 1.27 
- - +165.7142 1.66 - - +134.3733 1.29 
- - -56.3019 0.59 - - -140.4555 1.40 
- - -190.1783 0.66 - -
-208.8743 0.70 
- - 394.9546 2.00* - - +480.2338 2.34* 
- - -55.1962 0.31 - - -79.4224 0.44 
- -
-491.4930 2.21* - - -469.0948 2.01* 
+1234.4066 4.28* +1227.3094 4.22* +1143.3801 3.36* +1164o5008 3.39* 
.16 - .18 - .08 - .11 -
267 - 267 - 267 - 267 -
Table 12. Hours worked, white males aged 25-54, households receiving public transfers excluded 
1971 results using actual wages^  1971 results using 
reservation wages 
helïth «ealth heaîth Health """" 
ê tê tê tp t 
Age + .4305 0, .07 +3 .1554 0. 49 +9 .0974 1 .25 +9. ,8963 1 .33 
Education +50 .4830 2, .95* +65 .1496 3c ,78* +36 .4153 2 .13* +47. ,5969 2 .73* 
Asset income + .0916 2, .34* + .0897 2. 32* + .1181 2, .96* +. 1120 2 .81* 
Family transfers + .0716 0, .23 - ,  .1077 Oc ,33 -.0972 0, .30 ,2199 0, i66 
Norirespondent income — <  .0023 0, 17 .0007 Oc ,05 -.0029 0, .20 
— .  
,0011 0. 08 
Marital status +133 .2657 0. 86 +76, .4087 0. ,49 -235 .0070 1, .30 -246 c 2483 1, ,37 
Rural residence/UE +102, .2259 0. 78 +194, .3866 1. ,49 -8 .4243 0. ,06 +98. 2100 0. 72 
Hourly wages -54, .2805 4. 47* -56, .0381 4. 71* -173 .4106 3. 71* -152. 3482 3. 25* 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -238. 0912 2. 08* - - -221. 0801 1. 87 
Reaching limitations - - -304. 4157 2. 20* - — -211. 6411 1. ,48 
Lifting limitations - - +244. 9972 2„ 10* - - +202. 2027 1. ,69 
Sensory limitations - - -47. 3513 0. 43 - - -146. 7538 1. ,29 
Speech - - -263. ,7146 0. 81 - - -329. 6382 0. 98 
Hearing - - +376. ,8904 1. 70 - - +399. 7858 1. 75 
Mental disorders - - +52. ,3805 0. 23 - - +46o 5573 0. 20 
Nervous disorders - — -653. 5419 2. 17* — - —486, 6500 1. 55 
Constant 1534. 5210 4. 43* +1418. 6251 4. 08* +1264. ,6665 3. 45* +1253. 6712 3. 38* 
r2 13 - • 19 - .10 - . 14 -
N 189 — 189 — 189 - 189 -
*[29]. 
S^ignificant at the 5% level. 
Table 13. Hours worked, white males aged 55-64, households receiving public transfers excluded 
1971 results using actual wages* reser^aSo^wageS 
Independent health Health No health Health 
variable 
Age -40 .9035 1, .72 -49, .7816 2 .04* -39 .4630 1 .41 -47 .5496 1, .63 
Education +48 .2976 1, .79 +36 .3678 1 .29 +9 .0172 0, .29 -6 .5225 0, .20 
Asset income + .0511 1. 20 +, .0654 1, .49 -.0106 0, .24 +, .0001 0. 01 
Family transfers -.1113 0. 48 .2055 0, .80 -.1481 0, .58 +, .1595 0. 57 
Nonrespondent income -.0133 0. 81 — <  .0133 0. 78 -.0364 1, .99* .0322 1. 70 
Marital status —46 .6565 0. 20 +104, .4460 0. 43 -344 .8852 1. 30 -222, .0853 0. 80 
Rural residence/UE +312 .0417 1. 91 +284, .0115 1. 69 +28 .7999 0. 15 +34, .8033 0. 18 
Hourly wages -92 .9434 4. 49* -90. 0376 4, .15* -197, .3941 2. 16* -169. 1406 1. 77 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -274. 2521 1. 62 - - -438. 3079 2c ,43* 
Reaching limitations - - -202. ,9689 1. .06 - - +49-,4683 0. ,24 
Lifting limitations - - —64. ,3392 0. 38 - - -60. 5236 0. 33 
Sensory limitations - - -151. ,1543 0. ,97 - - -176. ,4263 1. ,03 
Speech - - +236. 8700 0, ,68 - - +56. ,2744 0. 15 
Hearing - - +21. 9807 0. ,12 - - +68. ,8561 0. 33 
Mental disorders - - +190. 8550 0. ,47 - - +281. ,7768 0. 63 
Nervous disorders - - +27. 7922 0, ,10 - - +55. ,5632 0. 18 
Constant +4270. ,7463 3. 02* +5039. 4716 3. 42* +4679. ,8879 2. 97* +5486. 5804 3. 31* 
R2 .27 — 28 - ,13 - . 14 -
N 87 - 87 - 87 — 87 —  
*[29]. 
^Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 14. Labor force participation, black males aged 25-54, 
household receiving DIABAPTD excluded 
Independent 
variable 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
ê t S t 
Age +.0019 0. ,54 +.0038 0. 12 
Education +.0133 1. ,79 +.0157 2. 27* 
Asset income 
-.0370 2. ,98* -.0351 3. ,15* 
Family transfers +.0018 0. 06 -.0108 0. ,42 
Public transfers 
-.0144 3. 76* -.0122 3. ,29* 
Nonrespondent income 
-.0049 2. 26* -.0043 2. ,03* 
Marital status +.0710 1. 26 +.0101 0. 19 
Rural residence/UE 
-.4093 1, .05 -.2314 0. 63 
Hourly wages +.0384 1. 49 +,0042 0. 17 
Stooping, walking limitations - - +.4386 1. 99 
Reaching limitations - - -.0725 1, .83 
Lifting limitations - - -.0698 1, .78 
Sensory limitations - - -.0660 1, .75 
Speech - - -.3090 1, .16 
Hearing - - -.2689 3, .25* 
Mental disorders - - -.2905 2, .63* 
Nervous disorders - - -.2999 3 .16* 
Constant +.9150 3 00
 
o
 
+.9841 4 .42* 
R2 
.13 - .33 -
N 145 - 145 -
[^9]. 
[^29]. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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1971 results using actual wages 1971 results usine 
reservation wages 
No health Health No health Health 
B t Î t B t B t 
-.0120 1.94 -.0095 1.06 -.0144 2.04* -.0092 1.02 
-.0207 1.52 -.0160 0.89 -.0198 1.30 -.0168 1.00 
-.0002 1.51 -.0002 1.34 -.0001 0.57 -.0002 0.83 
+.00001 0.14 -.000001 0.01 +.00003 0.34 +.0001 0.87 
+.000001 0.07 +.000006 0.24 +.000008 0.36 +.000004 0.17 
+.3028 2.68* +.2801 2.00* +.2164 1.01 +.0637 0.24 
+.1274 0.98 +.1681 1.12 +.0906 0.62 +.1162 0.70 
+.0467 3.15* +.0421 2.26* +.0029 0.51 +.0072 0.99 
- - +.0441 0.30 - - +.0668 0.43 
-
-
-.0558 0.29 - - -.0267 0.13 
-
-
-.0646 0.40 - - +.0006 0.00 
- -
-.0357 0.28 - - +.0816 0.61 
-
- +.1849 0.71 - - +.2910 1.14 
- -
-.1719 0.39 - - -.5553 1.50 
-
- +.1302 0.60 - - +.0983 0.46 
- - +.0898 0.34 - - +.1514 0.51 
+1.0898 3.21* +.9518 1.98 +.0855 0.81 -.1116 0.08 
.31 - .20 - .11 - .03 -
55 - 55 — 61 - 61 — 
Table 15. Labor force participation, black males aged 55-64, 
households receiving DIABAPTD excluded 
Independent 
variable 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
A ^ 
6 t B t 
Age -.0501 2. 43* -.0189 0.84 
Education -.0152 1. 23 -.0110 0.85 
Asset income -.0304 4. 03* -.0388 • 5.38* 
Family transfers -.0347 0. 17 +.0768 0.31 
Public transfers -.0166 2. 25* -.0109 1.32 
Nonrespondent income +.0015 0. 34 +.0047 0.79 
Marital status +.2895 2. 39* +.1353 1.11 
Rural residence/UE -.3230 0. 50 +.0780 0.11 
Hourly wages +.1222 0. 24 +.2175 0.37 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -.8266 1.90 
Reaching limitations - - +.0434 0.55 
Lifting limitations - - -.1447 1.33 
Sensory limitations - - +.1246 1.22 
Speech - - - -
Hearing - - - -
Mental disorders - - -.6016 0.06 
Nervous disorders - - - -
Constant 
R^  
3.9407 3. ,07* 2.0678 1.52 
.40 - .51 -
N 66 66 
*[9]. 
[^29]. 
^Significant at the 5% level. 
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1971 results using actual wages 1971 results usine 
reservation wages^  
No health Health No health Health 
3 t 3 t 3 t 6 t 
+.0349 1.48 +.0465 2.06* +.0204 0.64 +.0316 1.16 
-.0033 0.17 -.0071 0.37 -.0051 0.21 -.0039 0.18 
+.00009 0.47 +.0001 0.79 +.0003 0.92 +.0002 0.74 
+.0025 0.54 +.0056 1.14 +.0025 0.44 +.0081 1.49 
-.0001 1.13 -.0002 1.85 -.0001 0.65 -.0001 0.84 
+.00003 0.82 +.00003 1.10 -.00001 0.48 +.00001 0.30 
+.1282 0.75 +.1260 0.80 +.2510 0.65 -.0053 0.01 
+.1439 0.64 +.1016 0.47 +.0851 0.28 -.0080 0.03 
+.0907 3.58* +.0613 2.27* -.0021 0.18 +.0031 0.29 
- -
-.3573 2.17* - - -.5330 3.17* 
- -
-.0410 0.29 - - -.1445 0.94 
- - +.1198 0.77 - - +.2397 1.49 
- -
-.1313 0.95 - — -.2132 1.36 
- - - - - -
-.1255 0.19 
-
- -.6839 1.73 - - -.6622 1.49 
- -
-.1682 0.87 - - -.2884 1.27 
- - +.5442 1.78 - - +.4348 1.28 
-1.6454 1.12 -1.9302 1.32 -.2856 0.16 -1.1375 0.68 
.17 - .37 - -.09 - .25 -
42 - 42 - 46 - 46 -
Table 16. Labor force participation, black males aged 55-64, 
households receiving any public transfers excluded 
Independent 
variable 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
A A 
3 t B t 
Age +.0052 0.50 -.0040 0.26 
Education +.0078 1.11 +.0123 1.11 
Asset income -.0306 6.89* -.0290 5.44* 
Family transfers +.0378 0.41 -.0600 0.18 
Nonrespondent income +.0015 0.60 +.0039 0.70 
Marital status +.0025 0.03 -.0443 0.44 
Rural residence/UE +.0891 0.18 +.1349 0.19 
Hourly wages +.2497 0.85 +.1557 0.33 
Stooping, walking limitations - -
-.0623 0.19 
Reaching limitations - -
-.0318 0.45 
Lifting limitations - - -.0566 0.62 
Sensory limitations - — -.0973 1.01 
Speech - - - -
Hearing - - - -
Mental disorders - - - -
Nervous disorders - - - -
Constant +.5676 0.84 1.1909 1.33 
R2 
.78 - .74 -
N 29 29 
*[9]. 
[^29]. 
^Significant at the 5% level. 
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1971 results using actual wages 1971 results usine 
reservation wages^  
No health Health No health Health 
t t 6 t B t 
+.0233 0.86 +.0464 1.57 -.0011 0.04 +.0297 1.11 
-.0025 0.10 -.0125 0.48 +.0089 0.33 -.0046 0.20 
-.00005 0.05 -.0008 0.75 +.0007 0.68 -.0007 0.70 
+.0032 0.63 +.0054 0.94 .0030 0.51 +.0070 1.27 
+.00002 0.68 +.00006 1.22 -.00003 1.04 +.000008 0.18 
+.1918 0.96 +.1168 0.57 +.1638 0.63 -.3668 1.46 
+.1584 0.66 +.1564 0.63 +.0198 0.07 -.3095 1.11 
+.0823 2.99* +.0608 1.80 +.0032 0.44 +.0184 2.41* 
— -
-.3067 1.37 - - -.6687 3.22* 
- - +.0044 0.02 - - -.1493 0.91 
- - +.1200 0.58 - - +.2472 1.38 
- -
-.1230 0.66 - - -.3630 1.98 
- - - - - - +.2492 0.34 
-
- -.6489 1.42 - - -.7974 1.79 
- -
-.2074 0.89 — — -.2916 1.54 
- - +.6036 1.60 - - +.4822 1.37 
-1.0189 0.61 -2.0142 1.06 +.1114 0.06 -3.0044 1.60 
.10 - .19 - -*06 - .30 -
34 - 34 - 38 - 38 -
Table 17. Labor force participation, black males aged 25-54, 
households receiving public transfers excluded 
Independent 
variable 
1965 results* 
No health Health 
A A 
e t 6 t 
Age -.0036 0.92 +.0049 1.20 
Education +.0070 0.78 +.0121 1.34 
Asset income -.0596 4.04* -.0492 3.42* 
Family transfers -.1245 1.21 -.1168 1.23 
Nonrespondent income -.0147 4.30* -.0095 3.32* 
Marital status +.0365 0.54 -.0126 0.19 
Rural residence/UE -.2944 0.59 +.1712 0.35 
Hourly wages +.7315 2.77* +.6720 2.61* 
Stooping, walking limitations - - +.1170 0.38 
Reaching limitations - - -.0727 1.64 
Lifting limitations - - -.0822 1.63 
Sensory limitations - - -.1295 2.67* 
Speech - - - -
Hearing - - - -
Mental disorders - - -.1058 0.79 
Nervous disorders - - -.2063 1.80 
Constant 
R^  
+.7749 2.45* +.6151 1.99 
.35 - .45 -
N 81 81 
*[9]. 
[^29]. 
^Significant at the 5% level. 
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1971 results using actual wages 1971 results using 
reservation wages 
No health Health No health Health 
3 t 3 t G t 3 t 
-.0052 0.73 -.0072 0.64 -.0081 0.95 -.0058 0.46 
+.0012 0.93 +.0050 0.22 -.0020 0.12 +.0107 0.52 
-.0002 1.73 -.0003 1.53 -.0001 0.74 -.0002 1.13 
+.000004 0.18 +.00003 0.95 +.000006 0.23 +.00002 0.86 
+.3317 2.74* +.2015 1.19 +.2003 0.90 +.1457 0.60 
+.0994 0.74 +.0558 0.32 +.0651 0.42 +.0641 0.33 
+.0343 2.41* +.0175 0.89 +.0031 0.67 +.0022 0.43 
- - +.0785 0.46 - - -.0533 0.31 
-
-
-.1541 0.61 - - -.0854 0.35 
- - +.3898 1.63 - - +.4958 2.03* 
- -
-.0244 0.16 - - -.0197 0.11 
- - +.2143 0.70 - - +.1193 0.40 
- - +.3458 0.58 - -
-.0616 0.15 
- - +.0088 0.03 - - -.0041 0.02 
- - +.2795 0.77 - - +.2696 0.67 
+.7041 1.86 +.7544 1.33 +.4299 0.56 +.3622 0.42 
.24 - .13 - .05 - -.04 -
40 - 40 - 45 - 45 -
Table 18. Hours worked, black males aged 25-54, households 
receiving DIABAPTD excluded 
Independent 
variable 
1965 results^  
No health Health 
A 
g t g t 
Age +.0006 0.68 +.0009 1.04 
Education +.0010 0.55 +.0017 1.64 
Asset income -.0068 1.82 +.0070 1.94 
Family transfers -.0106 1.61 -.0075 1.16 
Public transfers -.0019 1.62 -.0001 0.51 
Nonrespondent income -.0005 0.80 -.0007 0.99 
Marital status +.0088 0.60 +.0124 0.85 
Rural residence/UE - - - -
Hourly wages -.0016 2.73* -.0017 2.61* 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -.0818 1.32 
Reaching limitations - - +.0186 1.64 
Lifting limitations - - -.0251 2.08* 
Sensory limitations - - -.0012 0.12 
Speech - - - -
Hearing - - +.0358 1.23 
Mental disorders - - - -
Nervous disorders - - -.0200 0.64 
Constant +.0825 1.41 +.0475 0.80 
R2 
.13 - .19 -
N 
*[9]. 
[^29]. 
^Significant at the 5% level. 
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1971 results using actual wages 
No health Health 
1971 results usin; 
reservation wages 
No health Health 
-18.1062 0.92 -19.1079 0.81 -7.3147 0.36 -4.1736 0.17 
+15.5352 0.37 -42.6406 0.92 -1.2717 0.30 -36.7011 0.69 
-.2380 0.42 -.2222 0.40 -.5387 1.00 -.4721 0.75 
-.1810 1.00 -0.3258 1.78 .0696 0.23 -.2018 0.65 
-.0176 0.28 +.0411 0.55 -.0243 0.36 -.0286 0.39 
+622.1547 1.70 +6.3109 0.01 +258.6201 0.43 +401.2986 0.54 
-97.3656 0.27 -51.2184 0.14 -167.2032 0.43 -44.7450 0.11 
-68.1328 1.56 -95.4233 1.95 +16.4275 0.99 +3.9545 0.23 
- - -235.5998 0.56 - - -589.7517 1.38 
- - -1292.3796 1.52 - - -624.9922 0.74 
- - +765.4072 1.11 - - +210.3500 0.31 
-
-
-120.9307 0.37 - - -140.5541 0.39 
- - +294.7506 0.42 - - -315.0078 0.46 
- - +3566.1697 2.54* - - +2557.6845 1.83 
- -
-1133.8055 2.13* - - -1081.3473 1.89 
- - +568.5774 0.67 - - 6.5524 0.01 
1953.1926 1.84 +3359.2736 2.68* -1198.0523 0.42 +1763.8930 0.60 
.08 - .28 - .04 - .17 -
41 - 41 - 41 - 41 -
Table 19. Hours worked, black males aged 55-64, households 
receiving DIABAPTD excluded 
1965 results^  
Independent 
variable No health Health 
3 t 3 t 
Age +.0035 0.63 _ 
Education +.0075 2.10* - -
Asset income -.0004 0.05 +.0083 1.53 
Family transfers +.0489 0.87 +.1303 2.22* 
Public transfers -.0051 2.76* -.0040 2.28* 
Nonrespondent income 
-.0015 1.36 -.0036 0.35 
Marital status +.0516 1.52 - -
Rural residence/UE +.0051 0.26 - -
Hourly wages +.0104 0.61 +.0528 0.36 
Stooping, walking limitations 
Reaching limitations - - -.0181 2.14* 
Lifting limitations - -
-.0361 1.69 
Sensory limitations - -
-.0021 0.11 
Speech - - - -
Hearing - - -.0238 0.63 
Mental disorders - - - -
Nervous disorders - - - -
Constant -.1734 0.49 +.1802 8.00* 
R2 
.18 - .40 -
N 40 - 40 -
*[9]. 
[^29]. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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1971 results using actual wages^  1971 results using 
reservation wages 
No health Health No health Health 
3 t 3 t 3 t 3 t 
+14.0021 0.28 +8.3584 0.16 +32.1861 0.68 +33.5200 0.62 
+12.3144 0.32 +15.4589 0.42 +.1170 0.01 +30.3917 0.68 
-.1644 0.44 +.0403 0.11 +.0616 0.14 -.0693 0.13 
-4.7561 0.54 3.8095 0.34 -2.7096 0.31 +1.6132 0.13 
+.1184 1.54 +.0377 0.48 +.1307 1.73 +.0523 0.64 
+109.0571 0.29 +166.4915 0.47 +559.8601 1.01 +27.2571 0.03 
-517.3691 1.09 -776.5650 1.62 -228.8347 0.48 -663.4530 1.20 
-24.6716 0.44 -72.0961 1.26 -14.0878 0.98 +6.9887 0.29 
-
-
-343.5244 0.91 - - -332.3727 0.83 
-
- +21.5152 0.06 - — +126.6186 0.33 
-
- +162.4155 0.44 - - +218.9698 0.56 
-661.9654 2.19* — — -712.3654 2.04 
-449.7970 0.79 
— 
-218.7918 0.35 
-
- -1034.3139 1.64 - - -828.2028 1.30 
+293.8014 - +1517.4728 0.44 +1136.4229 0.36 -1461.0058 0.38 
.07 - .29 - .10 - .22 -
31 - 31 - 31 - 31 -
Table 20. Hours worked, black males aged 25-54, households receiving public transfers excluded 
1971 results using actual wages^  1971 results 
reservation 
; using 
wages ^ 
Independent 
variables No health Health No health Health 
3 t 6 t B t 6 t 
Age -22.8689 1 .02 -6.9282 0.23 -14 .6322 0 .68 -6.7975 0.24 
Education +26.4862 0 .60 -22.1698 0.37 +19 .2338 0 .44 -32.544 0.57 
Asset income -.1499 0 .26 -.3636 0.53 -.0453 0 .85 -.3076 0.47 
Family transfers - - - - - - - -
Nonrespondent income +.0203 0 .32 -.0127 0.14 -.0468 0 .69 -.1116 1.47 
Marital status +736.2324 1 .87 +389.6872 0.68 +101 .9638 0 .18 +46.8144 0.07 
Rural residence/UE +102.8221 0 .26 -235.3779 0.55 +80 .9784 0 .21 -202.8386 0.49 
Hourly wages -67.8457 1 .55 -75.6126 1.38 +21 .2182 1 .86 +20.7645 1.85 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -374.0763 0.71 - - -797.1270 1.88 
Reaching limitations - - -596.9303 0.61 - - -40.5029 0.05 
Lifting limitations - - +446.0978 0.58 - - -30.5772 0.05 
Sensory limitations - - —643.8667 1.57 - - -392.7245 0.96 
Speech - - -7266.7167 0.28 - - -923.4799 1.20 
Hearing - - +2997.8057 1.82 - - 2374.6366 1.61 
Mental disorders - - -1407.2779 1.87 - - -1344.1404 1.86 
Nervous disorders - - -53.7378 0.06 - - -307.4972 0.35 
Constant +1884.7226 1. 63 +2737.0322 1.86 -1750. 7896 0. 89 -472.5450 0.23 
R2 
.13 - .24 - .17 - .30 -
N 33 - 33 - 33 - 33 -
*[29]. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 21. Hours worked, black males aged 55-64, households receiving public transfers excluded 
1971 results using actual wages^  1971 results using 
reservation wages 
Independent health Health No health Health 
variable 
Age +6.3302 0 .12 +21.1058 0.29 +9 .6534 0 .19 +35.2913 0.57 
Education +15.3617 0 .36 +20.7030 0.44 +12 .4227 0 .26 +21.6693 0.43 
Asset income -.0832 0 .05 -.2185 0.11 -.0613 0 .03 —.4364 0.19 
Family transfers -3.9241 0 .46 +.5641 0.05 -3 .4713 0 .39 -.3582 0.03 
Nonrespondent income +.1016 1 .14 +.0270 0.25 + .1045 1 .17 -.0360 0.34 
Marital status +665.1910 1 .63 +481.7981 1.14 +738 .0148 1 .26 +494.1366 0.52 
Rural residence/UE -410.8124 0 .90 -587.5402 1.10 -353 .4086 0 .63 -514.0695 0.70 
Hourly wages -4.2557 0 .08 -25.6325 0.38 -2 .8847 0 .15 .6923 0.02 
Stooping, walking limitations - - +51.2240 0.12 - - +68.0912 0.10 
Reaching limitations - - +193.9403 0.43 - - +250.5259 0.58 
Lifting limitations - - +15101114 0.33 - - +170.1752 0.37 
Sensory limitations - - -393.8852 1.05 - - -407.1105 0.84 
Speech - - - - - - - -
Hearing - - - - - - - -
Mental disorders - - -391.9813 0.62 - - -317.2424 0.50 
Nervous disorders - -
-1043.6636 1.38 - - -952.9761 1.24 
Constant +163.4945 0. ,05 -211.3150 0.05 +379. 1295 0. 10 -1331.0188 0.23 
R^  .18 - .26 - .18 - .25 -
N 25 — 25 — 25 — 25 — 
*[29]. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE SUPPLY OF AND THE DEMAND 
FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE 
Introduction 
In this chapter our objective is to update and expand the BJM [9] 
analysis in order to explain the size of the Social Security Disability 
Insurance Program (DI). We do this by identifying and analyzing the 
importance of variables which influence an individual's decision to 
apply for DI and those which reflect the outcome of the application 
process. 
In estimating the demand for DI benefits, our interest is to 
understand the application process. Specifically, we want to look at 
the effects of health and of benefit levels on the probability of 
application. 
There has been some speculation that increased benefit levels 
for DI recipients are a major cause of recent increases in the disability 
incidence rate. The disability incidence rate is the fraction of 
insured workers who are granted DI benefits each year [5]. Increases 
in the disability incidence rate result in increased costs of the DI 
program. If benefit levels are an important determinant of the 
probability of applying for DI benefits, then they may well be an 
important explanation for increases in the disability incidence rate 
and the increasing cost of the DI program. 
We continue our investigation of the effect of functional limita­
tions on labor supply by including health variables in our model of 
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the probability of application for DI benefits. We expect that ill 
health is an important factor in an individual's decision to apply for 
DI but that it is not the only reason. Other economic and demographic 
characteristics are expected to play an important part in the applica­
tion decision. 
The awards procedure for determining disability status involves 
three steps. First the applicant is evaluated on the basis of criteria 
contained in the Social Security Administration medical listings. 
If the applicant fails to qualify under the first test, he may qualify 
if his Impairments are such that they are considered to be the 
equivalent of those contained in the listings. If the applicant is 
not accepted under the first two tests, he is evaluated under a third 
which includes consideration of his education, work experience, and 
age in conjunction with his health. People who have few years of 
education, have worked for a long time in unskilled jobs, are elderly, 
are unable to qualify for jobs which are available in some 
areas of the country, and are in poor health may be judged eligible 
for DI benefits even if ill health alone would not qualify them [15]. 
To determine the importance of factors Involved in the award 
procedure we estimate the "supply" of DI benefits. We expect health 
to be an important determinant of acceptance. Given the third test, 
we also expect demographic variables such as age and education to 
be important in the acceptance equation. 
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Theoretical Considerations 
Any economic model of behavior embodies the notion of choice. 
In the model specifying the demand for DX benefits, we are assuming 
that the choice facing the individual is between applying for DT. 
benefits or not. Subsumed in the above is that the individual does 
have a choice. That is, his impairments are not so severe that he 
cannot participate in the labor force at all, nor so spurious that he 
perceives that there is no possibility of being granted DI benefits. 
The would-be applicant is assumed to know that the DI program 
has a means test such that if he earns more than a maximum amount per 
month^  he will lose his benefits (after a grace period). The comparison 
the individual is expected to make is between the income he could 
earn without DI benefits and the income he would receive if accepted 
which consists of benefits plus any amount he earns himself up to the 
maximum allowed. In addition, the individual must weigh the tradeoff 
between changes in his income, if accepted, and his preferences for 
leisure. That is, the potential applicant maximizes utility, not 
income. 
2 
The model is illustrated in Figure 1. The income-leisure 
constraint is represented by LD, the slope of which is the wage rate. 
Dealing only with market choices for the moment, the individual 
maximizes utility at a point such as E, where one of a set of strictly 
T^he amount was $140 in 1971 and is $280 in 1979. 
2 
The following discussion is based on BJM [9, pp. 112-113]. 
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Figure 1. The demand for leisure 
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convex indifference curves (not shown) is tangent to the income-leisure 
constraint. The income he earns is OE' and he consumes OM amount of 
leisure. If the individual were accepted for DI, assume he would 
receive a benefit equal to OP and that the maximum amount of income 
he may earn without losing benefits is PQ. The line AB represents DI 
benefits (OP) plus any amount he can earn up to the maximum. That is, 
if he works LR amount of time he will earn the maximum allowable 
earnings given his wage rate. If he works more than LR, he will lose 
DI benefits and the relevant constraint becomes CED. The total 
constraint facing the individual after introducing the possibility 
of receiving DI benefits is ABCED. The individual maximizes utility 
at a point such as F where he is on a higher indifference curve than 
at point E. 
If the wage rate goes up so that the individual's opportunities 
are reflected by the income-leisure constraint AB'C'D'and the individual 
was initially at a point such as F, he may work more or less, depending 
on the relative sizes of the income and substitution effects. If 
he is at point B, he may reduce the amount of time he spends working. 
He may do this because if he continues to work LR amount of time, he 
will lose DI benefits. Only if there is an indifference curve that 
passes through point B' and cuts the income-leisure constraint LC'D' 
from above will he increase the amount of time he spends on work. 
The "supply" of DI benefits is not a supply curve in an economic 
sense because there is no price variable involved. We estimate the 
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probability of being accepted as a DI beneficiary because our interest 
is in the scope of the DI program and not all applicants are awarded 
benefits. 
The Application Model 
The statistical model 
The model we tested to identify the independent variables which 
are important in the application process is as follows: 
Probability of application = 6q + Opportunity cost 
+ Transfer income + Asset income + Net value of 
assets + 3^  Spouse's income + Family transfers 
+ gy Age + gg Education + gg Number of dependent children 
+ g^ Q Rural residence + g^  ^Race + ^ 2^ 2" "^ 26 health 
limitations. 
The independent variables fall into three categories; economic variables, 
demographic variables often used in labor supply models, and health 
variables. 
To test the hypothesis that higher benefit levels in relation to 
a person's market wage increase the probability of application, we 
followed BJM [9] in using the ratio of average monthly wages to 
expected benefits if accepted. This variable is an attempt to measure 
the opportunity cost facing the Individual when making the application 
decision. We expect that the higher the opportunity cost of receiving 
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DI benefits as compared to the return he could receive from working, 
the smaller is the likelihood of application. 
The health variables are dummy variables which indicate the respon­
dent's answers to questions about functional limitations. Examples 
are, "Do you have difficulty using stairs or inclines?" and "Can you 
use stairs or inclines at all?" [34, p. 5]. If the respondent answered 
yes to the first question, the health variable representing difficulty 
using stairs would equal one, and would equal zero otherwise. If the 
respondent answered no to the second question, the health variable 
representing inability to use stairs at all would equal one, and would 
equal zero otherwise. The health variables are independent of labor 
supply in that positive responses to the functional limitation questions 
are not associated with whether or not the respondent worked. 
We expect the presence of functional limitation to be positively 
related to the decision to apply for DI benefits because the more 
limitations a person has and the more severe the limitations, the 
greater the probability of being accepted if one applies for benefits. 
The model of the probability of applying for DI benefits is a 
labor supply model in that the higher the probability of applying, 
the lower the probability of labor force participation. Because of 
this we also include economic and demographic variables which are often 
used in labor supply models. These variables are education, family 
transfers, spouse's income, age, rural environment, transfer income 
(excluding DI), asset income, race, net value of assets, and the 
number of dependent children. 
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Education represents an investment in human capital and, as such, 
opens up broader work opportunities. The expected sign is negative. 
We expect the signs of the other income variables to be positive. 
The amount one receives from other sources of income reduces the 
proportionate loss of income if accepted for DI benefits. For example, 
if one family has asset income equal to $10,000 per year, wages equal 
to $10,000 per year and expects a benefit amount equal to $5,000 per 
year, the reduction in income equals 25 percent. Another family, 
with the same yearly wage and expected benefit amount but no asset 
income, would have a reduction in income equal to 50 percent. We 
expect the former to be more likely to apply. 
The transfer income variable includes transfers from such sources 
as private pensions. Veteran's benefits, railroad retirement, etc., 
which may be predicated on reduced labor supply. As BJM [9] point 
out, however, these transfers are not necessarily dependent on DI 
beneficiary status and therefore inclusion in the model seems warranted. 
We also expect the sign of the net value of assets to be positive. 
This variable represents, in a sense, a form of "security." The 
larger it is, the better able one is to cope with a reduced income if 
accepted. 
The effect of rural residence on the application rats is somewhat 
ambiguous. Lower wages and fewer job opportunities might encourage 
application. On the other hand, lack of knowledge about the program 
or a greater social stigma associated with not working could have the 
opposite effect. 
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Race is included because evidence from other labor market studies 
indicate that labor market behavior differs between races. This 
variable is entered as a dummy (black = 1, white = 0). Owing to the 
more restricted labor market opportunities for many black males, our 
expectation is that the coefficient will be positive. 
Age is included because of the tendency for disability to increase 
as workers grow older, both because of the higher incidence of physical 
and mental impairments and because of the tendency for chronic ailments 
to worsen over time. Therefore, we expect the sign of the age 
variable to be positive. 
Number of dependent children is included as a measure of a 
worker's obligation. Because a worker with a large number of children 
has a greater need for income, he is less likely to apply. 
Results 
The application regression was estimated using a sample from the 
1972 Social Security Survey of Disabled and Nondisabled Adults. 
Observations were limited to insured males aged 25-64 who reported 
some form of physical or mental impairment that limited their ability 
to work.^  
In general, the model supports the hypothesis that increasing 
benefit levels (reducing opportunity costs) increases the probability 
of application for DI. Eleven of the fifteen health variables had 
coefficients which were significant at the 5 percent level or better and 
S^ee Table 22 for the estimated coefficients. 
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Table 22. Probability of applying for disability insurance 
benefits, insured males aged 25-64 
Independent variables Coefficient^  t ratio 
Constant .0167 0.3 
Economic variables 
Opportunity cost -.0518 5.2* 
Transfer income .00003 7.6* 
Income from assets .000018 3.2* 
Net value of assets -.0000004 2.7* 
Spouse's income -.00001 0.6 
Intrafamily transfers -.00002 0.8 
Other labor supply variables 
Age (25-64) .0027 3.3* 
Education (0-19) -.0104 4.1* 
No. of dependent children -.0065 1.1 
Rural residence -.0036 0.2 
Race (black = 1, white = 0) .0833 3.0* 
Health variables 
Limitations in reaching 
Difficulty reaching .0928 4.1* 
Cannot reach at all .0925 2.3* 
Limitations in mobility 
Difficulty walking .1269 5.8* 
Cannot walk =.1678 2.5* 
Difficulty using stairs .0957 4.4* 
Cannot use stairs .1835 4.1* 
Difficulty stooping .0402 2.0* 
Cannot stoop .1705 5.2* 
Cannot lift heavy weights .0385 2.0* 
Speech impairment .0583 1.4 
Mental disorder .0791 2.8* 
Nervous disorder .0454 1.2 
Sensory disorders 
Hearing -.0434 1.6 
Trouble seeing -.0031 0.2 
Trouble seeing with glasses .1214 4.6* 
R^  = .278 
*[29]. 
*Signifleant at the 5 percent level. 
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have the correct sign. Six of ten labor supply variables are also 
significant at the 5 percent level. The percentage of the variance 
explained by the model is .278 which seems reasonable for cross-
sectional data. 
Our results are not strictly comparable with the BJM [9] results 
because we had insufficient information about how some of their 
variables were calculated. We will, however, note the similarities 
and differences between their results and ours and speculate on reasons 
for the differences. 
The opportunity cost variable is defined as average monthly wages 
divided by monthly benefits to be received if the respondent is awarded 
DI status,^  The estimated coefficient has a negative sign and is 
significant as expected. If benefit levels increase from $100 to $200 
per month when a person's market wages are $400 per month, the increase 
in the probability of application is 10.36 percent. This result is 
about twice the BJM [9, p. 129] figure of 5.327 percent, reinforcing their 
conclusion that increasing benefit levels results in an increasing 
number of applications for DI. 
All except four of the coefficients of the health dummies were 
significant and all but three had the correct sign. The inability 
to use stairs or inclines causes an increase in the probability of 
application of 18 percent, and the inability to stoop causes an increase 
of 17 percent. Two of the variables which had negative signs were not 
S^ee Appendix D for a discussion of how the opportunity cost 
variable was derived. 
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significantly different from zero. The coefficient of the variable, 
has difficulty walking, is positive and significant but the coefficient 
of the variable, cannot walk at all, has a negative sign and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. There is no obvious intuitive or 
theoretical explanation for this. One might hypothesize that someone 
who is so seriously impaired as to be unable to walk and has enough 
work experience to qualify for DI benefits, has an extremely strong 
commitment to the labor force; that his disability becomes a challenge 
to overcome. 
Although we do not have information on how BJM [9] constructed 
their health variables, in general our results agree with theirs. 
One exception is the coefficient of nervous disorders. BJM [9] find 
the coefficient significant at the one percent level while we find it 
insignificant. In the 1972 survey, the condition categories included 
in the nervous disorder variable were rather vague. For example, 
the respondent was asked if he had "chronic nervous disorders" and 
"other nervous disorders" [34]. Perhaps BJM [9] had a more well-
defined variable. 
The coefficients of the labor supply variables generally had the 
correct sign and were significant. Age, as expected, has a positive 
sign and is significant. The coefficient of education is negative, as 
expected, and significant. Two of the other income variables (transfer 
income and income from assets) have the correct sign and are significant. 
Two others (spouse's income and family transfers) have the incorrect 
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sign and are not significant. This is consistent with work done by 
others [3] who have found that spouse's income has little effect on 
the participation of married men. 
The BJM [9] coefficient for spouse's wage is also negative but 
significant at the one percent level. Our measure of spouse's income 
is 1971 income while BJM's measure is spouse's average monthly earnings 
on her last job. Our choice of this variable was made because of lack 
of data, not theoretical conviction, but we feel more comfortable 
with a negative sign if the results are insignificant. 
The coefficient for net value of assets also has a negative sign 
and is significant. This is unexpected in view of our hypothesis that 
the more wealth one has, the more likely is he to apply for DI benefits, 
other things equal, because the wealthier one is, the less does one 
need to use income to acquire assets and/or pay off debts. The 
consequences of a reduced income stream, if accepted for DI, are 
mitigated. BJM results are similar to ours and they argue that the 
net value of assets may serve as a proxy for a person's inclination 
to work [9, p. 127]. 
The sign of the race dummy is significant and positive as expected. 
This may be due to the fact that discrimination has resulted in a smaller 
set of job opportunities for many blacks or that blacks are more likely 
to hold physically demanding jobs which they no longer can perform 
if they have limitations. 
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The Awards Model 
The statistical model 
The regression equation we used to estimate the probability of 
acceptance as a DI beneficiary after application is as follows: 
Probability of acceptance = 3^  + Health variables 
+ 6^  ^Severity of disability + Age + Rural 
residence + Education + Number of dependent 
children + Race. 
The awards model includes all the health variables included in 
the application model. We expect a positive relationship between 
the probability of acceptance and the existence of functional limita­
tions in light of the medical impairments requirements of the first 
test an applicant must pass in order to be accepted. 
The remaining variables are demographic. The age variable was 
included because ill health is more likely to occur among older 
persons and chronic health problems may worsen with age. In addition, 
the Social Security Administration regulations are more permissive 
in allowing benefits for older workers. We expect the sign to be 
positive. 
The race variable was included for two reasons. First, if more 
blacks apply for disability benefits, it may be that more claims are 
questionable and therefore blacks have a higher denial rate. In 
this case, we expect a positive relationship between race (white = 1, 
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black = 0) and probability of acceptance. On the other hand, blacks 
may be more poorly educated and/or more likely to have a history of 
work in unskilled occupations, therefore qualifying them for acceptance 
under the third test. In this case, we expect a negative relationship. 
If persons who live in a rural environment and persons who 
have dependent children are less likely to apply for DI benefits, 
we expect the probability of acceptance to be higher because fewer 
claims would be suspect. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship 
between rural residence (rural = 1, nonrural = 0) and/or the number of 
dependent children and the probability of acceptance. 
The sign of the education variable is ambiguous. As indicated 
previously, people with more education are less likely to apply for 
DI benefits and therefore (following the same reasoning as above) more 
likely to be awarded disability status. On the other hand, the more 
education a person has, the more likely it is he will be able to find 
alternative job opportunities if he becomes impaired. 
A dummy variable was included to capture the effects of "severe" 
disabilities on the probability of acceptance. If the respondent 
indicated he was unable to perform any one of the functions, such as 
reaching, etc., the variable was given a value of one, zero otherwise. 
We expect a positive relationship between this variable and the 
probability of acceptance. 
The applicant is automatically turned down if he has earnings 
greater than $140 per month in 1971. Therefore, the values of the 
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Independent variables are constrained to equal zero if the applicant 
earned more than $140 in the year when he applied. 
The results 
The regression was estimated using a subsample of the 1972 Social 
Security Survey of Disabled and Nondisabled Adults [29]. The respondents 
consisted of 618 insured males, aged 25-64, who had applied for DI 
benefits in 1968, 1969, 1970 or 1971. 
The award model only explains 14 percent of the variance of the 
probability of application and only three of the independent variables 
were significant at the 5 percent level. Two of the health variables 
were significant and positive as expected. These are the "difficulty 
reaching" dummy and the "difficulty using stairs" dummy. Five of the 
health dummies had negative signs indicating reduced probability of 
acceptance but none were significantly different from zero. . 
Age was the only significant demographic variable. The education 
variable, although insignificant, had a negative sign suggesting that 
people with more education are more likely to have residual capacity 
when they become impaired. The sign of the race dummy was positive, 
supporting the hypothesis that blacks are more likely to be turned 
down when they apply for disability benefits. 
The model constructed and tested by BJM [9] explains 34 percent 
of the variance. All of the health variables they used were significant 
as were all of the demographic variables. BJM use data from 1965 and 
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Table 23. Probability of being awarded disability insurance 
benefits, insured male applicants aged 25-64 
Independent variables Coefficient^  t ratio 
Constant .2361 13.8* 
Health variables 
Limitations in reaching 
Difficulty reaching .1264 2.4* 
Cannot reach at all .0679 0.8 
Limitations on mobility 
Difficulty walking -.0242 0.4 
Cannot walk -.0158 0.1 
Difficulty using stairs .1744 2.9* 
Cannot use stairs .1679 1.9 
Difficulty stooping .0429 0.7 
Cannot stoop .0698 0.9 
Cannot lift heavy weights -.0457 0.9 
Speech impairment .0176 0.2 
Mental disorder .1159 1.9 
Nervous disorder .1079 1.0 
Sensory disorders 
Hearing ,0649 0.9 
Trouble seeing -.0217 0.4 
Trouble seeing with glasses -.1183 1.6 
Severity of disability .0454 0.9 
Demographic variables 
Age (25-64) .0073 3.2* 
Rural environment -.0643 1.2 
Education (0-19) -.0215 1.8 
No. of dependent children .0217 1.4 
Race .-0633 0.9 
*[29]. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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and use more aggregated measures of health than we do.^  In addition, 
it is not clear how BJM constructed their health variables. 
Conclusions 
The results of the application model are reasonably good, both 
2 in terms of the R and the number of significant variables. In 
addition, the results using 1971 data are consistent with the BJM [9] 
results using 1965 data. Both show a statistically significant inverse 
relationship between opportunity cost and application rate. 
As noted in the introduction to this'chapter, determination of 
disability status by the Social Security Administration follows a 
three-stage procedure which involves the interaction of health variables 
with age, education, type and length of work experience and employment 
opportunities. The BJM [9] model did not include the latter two 
variables, nor did we. The reasons we did not are: 1) because our 
desire to replicate the BJM [9] results for purposes of comparison, and 
2) the data set we were using did not contain some of the information 
necessary to construct these variables. 
To improve the fit of the acceptance equation, we suggest the 
following three approaches: 
Hje tested the awards model using more aggregated measure of 
health. In particular we combined the reaching dummies into one 
variable, the walking, using stairs, and stooping dummies into one 
variable, and the mental and nervous disorders dummies into one 
variable. There was no change in the results. 
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1. To measure the length of work experience, use the quarters 
of coverage that are available on the 1972 Social Security 
Survey of Disabled and Nondisabled Adults [29]. Quarters of 
coverage are available back to 1937. We would expect the 
larger the number of quarters of coverage, the higher the 
probability of acceptance. 
2. Construct a dummy variable indicating whether the applicant 
had worked as an unskilled laborer according to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce's occupation classification. We would 
expect a positive relationship between this variable and the 
probability of acceptance. 
3. Use a regional (preferably state) unemployment rate as a 
proxy for employment opportunities. 
The higher the regional unemployment rate, the lower the probability 
of acceptance because unemployed people may be applying on spurious 
health grounds. 
Our results suggest that the health effect on acceptance is much 
weaker than do the BJM [9] results. An explanation might be that more 
and more people are being accepted under the second and third tests 
rather than the first. The value of the constant term is large and 
significant. This reinforces the suspicion that other variables are 
needed in the regression to explain the probability of acceptance. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
Summary 
The prime focus of this analysis has been to estimate the labor 
supply response of persons who consider themselves to be disabled to 
various types of functional limitations. Labor supply was measured 
in terms of labor force participation, annual hours worked, and the 
decision to apply for Disability Insurance (DI). It is expected that 
people do not leave the labor force, reduce annual hours worked, or 
decide to apply for DI on the basis of functional limitations alone but 
on the interaction between functional limitations and other economic 
and social characteristics. To test this hypothesis, we compared 
models of labor force behavior which did not contain variables repre­
senting functional limitations to models which did. 
Our results support the hypothesis that the addition of functional 
limitations does not contribute much to the explanation of labor 
—2 force behavior for disabled white males. The R of the latter models 
—2 is only marginally higher than the R of the former in most cases. 
The data do not, however, support the hypothesis for black males. For 
—2 
older black males, the addition of health variables caused the R to 
increase by more than 100 percent in the participation equations for 
all groups and by as much as 600 percent in one case. For the older 
—2 group who received no DIABAPTD, the health model increased the R 
by as much as 314 percent in the hours worked equations. For younger 
black males who received no DIABAPTD, the health model increased the 
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R by more than 200 percent in the hours worked regressions. For the 
participation regression, however, the health version of the model 
—2 
resulted in a decrease in R for younger black males. 
These results suggest that poor health does play an important 
role in the labor supply decisions of older black males, particularly 
in the participation choice. Younger black males, on the other hand, 
are not likely to drop out of the labor force because of poor health. 
Their response to poor health seems to be in the form of a reduction in 
hours worked. This group seems more like white males than older black 
males, at least in their labor force participation response to health 
variables. 
Our results, using 1971 data, do a poorer job, in general, of 
explaining labor force behavior than the results using 1965 data, but 
the results we get are fairly consistent with those obtained by 
BJM [9]. The major difference between our results and the BJM results 
[9, pp. 101-106] is that they report a large increase (154 percent) 
—2 in R with the addition of health variables in the participation regres­
sion of younger black males who receive no DIABAPTD. As noted above, 
—2 
we observe a decrease in R when health variables are added for this 
group. In the hours worked regression for this group, BJM [9] find 
—2 
a relatively small increase in K using the health model while we find 
a large increase. In 1971, this group seemed to adjust hours worked 
in response to ill health rather than by leaving the labor force. In 
1965, the opposite behavior appeared to be the case. These comparisons 
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suggest that, for those blacks who choose to be members of the labor 
force, the existence of functional limitations does not deter their 
participation. It may be that these black males have a stronger 
labor force commitment than their counterparts questioned in 1965. 
The independent variables which appear to be the most closely 
associated with health are marital status, age and education. In 
particular, our results support the suspicion that marital status 
derives some of its importance in determining labor supply from its 
relationship with mental and nervous disorders. Age and health also 
appear to be related. For younger males, much of the impact on labor 
supply presumed to be caused by aging may be due, rather, to poor 
health. For older males, aging may exacerbate existing functional 
limitations. There is some evidence that more years of education 
enables an individual to continue working in spite of limitations 
because, the more highly educated one is, the more job alternatives 
are available. In a sense, education can compensate for physical 
limitations, at least up to some point. 
The estimates of reservation wages for white males seemed to be 
reasonable in that they conformed to our expectations. In the probit 
equation, eight of the fourteen independent variables were significant 
and most had the correct sign. In the wage offer equation, half of 
—2 the independent variables were significant and the R was equal to .43 
which is reasonable for cross-sectional data. 
The results for black males leave a great deal to be desired. 
In the probit equation, only the health dummy, the marital status 
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dummy and the public transfer coefficient are significant and have the 
correct sign. The wage offer equation has no significant coefficients 
and they are all quite small. The derived reservation wage equation 
has coefficients which seem too large, for the most part, and often 
have unexpected signs. In addition, the estimated standard deviation 
is equal to -43.2 which is ten times the size of the standard deviation 
estimated for the white sample. All of these things lead us to suspect 
that the model is misspecified for black males. 
Given the unsatisfying results for the reservation wages of black 
males, we were not surprised that actual wages did a better job in 
explaining the variation in the labor supply models for these samples 
in Chapter 3. We were disappointed, however, in the labor supply 
models when using the reservation wages for white males. In only one 
case (the participation regression for younger white males who received 
no transfers) did the use of reservation wages result in even a 
—"2 
marginally higher R than using actual wages. In general, reservation 
—2 
wages did just about as well (in terms of R ) as actual wages in the 
participation equations for white males, but actual wages performed 
better in the hours worked equations. This may be because reservation 
wages conceptually are more closely related to the participation 
decision than the hours worked decision= 
The probability that a disabled person will apply for DI seems 
to be fairly well explained by our model. Among the economic variables 
in the model, opportunity cost, transfer income, and asset income have 
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the predicted sign and are significant. The significant demographic 
variables are age, education and race and all have the expected sign. 
Eleven of the fifteen health variables are significant. Of these, only 
one has the incorrect sign. Overall, the results using 1971 data are 
consistent with the BJM [9] results. 
The awards model we tested did a much poorer job of explaining 
the probability that an applicant will be granted DI benefits. Only 
one of the health variables, difficulty using stairs, is statistically 
significant. Of the demographic variables included in the model, 
only the age variable had a significant coefficient. 
Problems and suggestions for future research 
One major caveat we enter in interpreting our results is the 
small sample size of the black cohorts. The 1972 survey [29] contained 
530 respondents who were disabled, male, and black. When persons aged 
20-24, and records for which there were missing data were eliminated, 
the total black sample was reduced to 353 observations. Further 
reductions in the sample were caused by eliminating transfer payment 
recipients. In light of our results for black males, which concur 
with BJM's [9] results, we would suggest that future surveys increase 
the number of observations in this cohort. Larger samples would make 
us more confident of the results. 
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The specification of the model we used to estimate reservation 
wages for the black samples needs to be revised. First, we suggest 
experimentation to ascertain which independent variable should be 
eliminated from the reservation wage equation. Second, variables should 
be included in the wage offer equation which indicate the effect of 
attitudes or discrimination on the wage offers blacks receive. Finally, 
variables which represent motivational factors should be included in 
the probit equation. 
Another issue which we feel requires further research is the 
measurement of the functional limitations. In our model we used 
dummy variables to indicate the presence or absence of a limitation. 
This method of representing the health variables has two drawbacks. 
First, it does not capture differences among persons with the same 
limitation. For example, a person may report he has difficulty walking. 
We do not know whether this person has lost a leg or whether a chronic 
case of the gout makes walking difficult. The former impairment may 
have a larger impact on labor supply than the latter. In addition, 
to represent all the various functional limitations requires a large 
number of dummy variables which can be cumbersome to use and may 
present statistical problems when samples are small. What is needed 
is some quantitative measures of health which reflect the loss of 
function as a continuous variable.^  
Berkowitz [8] has constructed a number of health variables by 
weighting responses to questions about function limitations according to 
American Medical Association values of the loss of such functions. For 
example, the loss of both legs is assigned a value of 64 percent of the 
whole person. Berkowitz assigns this value to a person who says he is 
unable to walk at all. If a person has mutliple limitations, the weights 
are added up. 
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Finally, we would like to investigate the effects of health on 
the labor supply of women. As more women enter the labor force, more 
will become eligible for disability insurance benefits and more women 
will be receiving these benefits on the basis of their own work history. 
In order to evaluate the DI program and to perhaps modify it in the 
future, it is necessary to have an understanding of the labor supply 
response of women to functional limitations. Previous research [3, 12] 
has suggested that married women may respond differently to traditional 
labor supply determinants than men do. This may be true of health 
variables as well. Or it may be that women, married or not, respond 
in a way similar to their male counterparts. In either case, information 
about this group of workers is important as a guideline for policy 
making. In the 1972 Survey of Disabled and Nondisabled Adults, more 
than half (55 percent) of the respondents who considered themselves 
disabled were women [1, p. 1]. Any analysis of the determinants of 
disability is not complete if information from half the sample is 
neglected, particularly when women make up a significant proportion 
of the labor force. 
Conclusions 
It is intuitively obvious that persons who suffer from chronic 
functional limitations are likely, ceteris paribus, to reduce labor 
supply. But other things are seldom equal. One person who has 
difficulty walking may not be employable because he has only a grade 
school education while another, with the same limitation, who has a 
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Ph.D. in nuclear engineering may command a salary in five figures. 
Public policies designed to provide income replacement for impaired 
individuals on the basis of medical considerations alone, therefore, 
do not address the problem adequately. Although the intent of Congress 
seems to have been initially to make DI benefits available based on 
medical criteria. Social Security regulations, in response to judicial 
interpretation of the disability insurance system, permit the granting 
of benefits based on the interaction of medical conditions with the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the applicant [9, p. 59]. This study 
provides support for this adjudication process. 
It also lends support to the hypothesis that increased benefit 
levels have a strong disincentive effect on labor force participation. 
Higher benefit levels increase application rates which may contribute 
to increased costs of the Disability Insurance Program. 
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APPENDIX A. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR 
THE PROSIT EQUATION 
Table A.l. Correlation coefficients—-white males—probit^  
Independent 
variables EXl EX2 EX3 EX4 SICK MARST MSPABS RURE EDUC SPINC NDEPC INCFA PUBTR PRVTR 
EXl 1 .50 .52 .51 .08 .20 -.003 -.05 -.38 .02 -.14 .11 .07 .04 
EX2 .50 1 .58 .57 .07 .16 .03 -.02 -.33 -.01 -.23 .06 .003 .05 
EX3 .52 .58 1 .65 -.03 .10 -.02 -.03 -.27 -.03 -.16 .11 -.07 -.05 
EX4 .51 .57 .65 1 -.09 -.002 .29 -.03 .24 .009 .02 .08 .02 -.01 
SICK .08 .07 .03 -.09 1 .07 -.02 -.09 .08 -.001 -.20 .01 -.16 .04 
MARST .20 .16 .10 -.002 .07 1 .15 -.02 -.09 -.32 -.32 .01 -.02 -.07 
MSPABS -.003 .03 -.02 .29 -.02 .15 1 .07 .01 -.004 .006 .03 -.02 -.07 
RURE -.05 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.09 -.02 .07 1 .18 .02 -.01 .001 -.10 .04 
EDUC -.38 -.33 -.27 .24 .08 -.09 .01 .18 1 -.09 .05 -.09 -.06 -.07 
SPINC .02 -.01 -.03 .009 -.001 -.32 -.004 .02 -.09 1 .09 .03 .02 .02 
NDEPC -.14 -.23 -.16 .02 -.20 -.32 .006 -.01 .05 .09 1 .03 .03 .04 
INCFA .11 .06 .11 .08 .01 .01 .03 .001 -.09 .03 .03 1 .003 .17 
PUBTR .07 .003 -.07 .02 -.16 -.02 -.02 -.10 -.06 .02 .03 .003 1 .58 
PRVTR .04 .05 -.05 -.01 .04 -,07 -.07 .04 -.07 .02 .04 .17 .58 1 
*[29]. 
Table A.2. Correlation coefficients—black males—probit^  
Independent 
variables EXl EX2 EX3 EX4 SICK MARST MSPABS RURE EDUC SPINC NDEPC INCFA PUBTR PRVTR 
EXl 1 .48 .46 .49 .22 .19 -.04 .06 -.46 .04 -.21 .09 .02 .12 
EX2 .48 1 .46 .52 „07 .06 -.07 .03 -.42 .04 -.30 -.05 .09 .14 
EX3 .46 .46 1 .53 -.006 .07 -.08 .38 -.40 .006 -.13 -.12 .05 .07 
EX4 .49 .52 .53 1 .03 .06 .001 .12 .29 .03 -.18 -.03 .13 .18 
SICK .22 -07 -.006 .03 1 -.06 -.09 -.05 .10 -.003 -.13 .12 -.05 -.09 
MARST .19 .06 -.07 .06 -.06 1 .40 -.08 -.11 .40 -.20 .03 -.21 -.06 
MSPABS -.04 -.07 -.08 .001 -.09 .40 1 .07 .01 -.08 -.09 .14 -.28 -.08 
RURE .06 .03 -.38 .12 -.05 -.08 .07 1 .11 .14 -.02 .01 -.02 .10 
EDUC -.46 -.42 -.40 .29 .10 -.11 .01 .11 1 -.14 .02 -.01 -.06 .08 
SPINC .04 .04 .006 .03 -.003 .40 -.08 .14 -.14 1 .05 .07 .17 -.02 
NDEPC -.21 -.30 -.13 -.18 -.13 -.20 -.09 -.02 .02 .05 1 .04 .006 .02 
INCFA .09 -.05 -.12 -.03 .12 .03 .14 .01 -.01 .07 .04 1 -.01 -.01 
PUBTR .02 .09 .05 .13 -.05 -.21 -.28 -.02 -.06 .17 .006 -.01 1 .05 
PRVTR .12 .14 .07 .18 -.09 -.06 -.08 .10 .08 -.02 .02 .01 .05 1 
*[29]. 
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APPENDIX B. LABOR SUPPLY RESULTS FROM COMBINED AGE-
GROUP SAMPLES FOR BLACK MALES 
Because of the small sample sizes of the black transfer-payment 
groups, we tested the models using combined age-group samples. By 
increasing the sample size, we increase the reliability of the estimates. 
—2 
The black samples showed the largest increases in R when health 
variables were added to the model. We wanted to see if this continues 
to be true in larger samples. Tables B.l to B.4 present the results. 
In most cases, the results are similar to the ones obtained in 
—2 the age-group samples. The R in the combined samples are close to 
being averages of the two R^ 's in the separate age group samples and the 
number of significant independent variables does not change much. In 
one case, however, the combined sample does a much better job in explain­
ing labor force behavior than either of the two age-group samples. For 
black males who receive no transfers, in the hours worked regressions the 
—2 —2 
combined sample has an R of .20 for the conventional model and an R of 
.35 for the health model; when using actual wages for the youner age group, 
—2 
the R were .13 and .24; and, for the older age group, they were .18 
and .26. In addition, the number of significant variables increased 
from none in either of the age group samples to five in the combined 
sample. 
The marital status variable is significant and positive for the 
no-transfer group in both models. The inclusion of health variables 
reduces the size of the coefficient of the marital status variable 
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712.5 to 618.4. This is consistent with results we discussed previously. 
The coefficient of wages is significant and negative in the health 
model, insignificant in the conventional model. It would appear the 
income effect of a change in wages is more pronounced when health 
variables are included. The health variables that are significant 
are sensory limitations, mental disorders, both of which have negative 
coefficients, and difficulty in hearing, which has a positive sign. 
The latter result also occurs in the no DIABAPTD subsample. A possible 
explanation is discussed in Chapter 3. 
The reason for the better performance of the combined age-group 
sample in the hours worked equation for the no-transfer cohort may be 
a statistical one. In more aggregated samples, there is a greater 
probability that the residuals will tend to cancel each other out, 
resulting in a better fit.^  
The results from the combined age-group sample bolster our 
confidence in the conclusions we drew from the smaller samples that 
there seems to be racial differences in the way individuals respond 
to functional limitations. 
This point was made to me in a discussion with James A. Stephenson. 
Table B.l. Labor force participation, black males, households receiving DIABAPTD excluded^ 
1971 results using actual wages 1971 results 
reservation 
using 
wages 
Independent 
variables No health Health No health Health 
3 t 3 t 3 t 3 t 
Age -.0031 0 .75 -.0007 0.15 -.0050 1 .05 -.0017 0.33 
Education -.0104 0 .94 -.00075 0.63 -.0098 0 .83 -.0091 0.77 
Asset income -.00006 0 .53 -.00006 0.53 +.000007 0 .06 -.00001 0.10 
Family transfers +.0034 0 .77 +.0038 0.77 +.0029 0 .55 +.0056 1.03 
Public transfers -.00002 0 .42 -.00002 0.35 +.00001 0 .16 +.00004 0.44 
Nonrespondent income +.00002 1 .16 +.00002 1.18 +.000005 0 .30 +.000005 0.30 
Marital status +.1803 1 .92 +.1946 1.93 +.1361 0 .84 +.0943 0.55 
Rural residence/UE +.1348 1 .18 +.1706 1.42 +.0712 0 .55 +.1047 0.80 
Hourly wages +.0562 4 .37* +.0533 3.82* +.0031 0 .74 +.0040 0.87 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -.0737 0.73 - - -.1210 1.11 
Reaching limitations - - -.0557 0.48 - — -.1081 0.91 
Lifting limitations - - +.0145 0.13 - — +.0976 0.85 
Sensory limitations - - -.0562 0.62 - — -.1191 1.24 
Speech - - +.0426 0.18 - - +.0965 0.46 
Hearing - - -.3197 1.19 - - -.3858 1.48 
Mental disorders - - +.0392 0.29 - — -.0911 0.69 
Nervous disorders - — +.1562 0.81 - - +.1332 0.62 
Constant +.6631 2. 49* +.5968 2.04* +.3817 0. ,50 +.2518 0.29 
R2 
.21 - .18 - .03 - .06 -
N 97 — 97 - 107 - 107 — " 
*[29]. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table B.2. Hours worked, black males, households receiving DIABAPTD excluded^ 
1971 results using actual wages 1971 results using 
reservation wages 
Independent No health Health No health Health 
variables 
Age -10.9603 1 .11 -9.6702 1.00 -3 .4310 0 .31 -4.9562 0.44 
Education +15.4455 0 .57 -.6362 0.02 +16 .7987 0 .60 +3.9637 0.14 
Asset income -.0831 0 .31 +.0352 0.14 -.1794 0 .64 -.0003 0.01 
Family transfers -4.6351 0 .48 +11.0064 1.12 -3 .9344 0 .39 +10.6232 1.00 
Public transfers -.0810 0 .59 -.1440 1.11 + .0035 0 .02 -.1157 0.57 
Nonrespondent income +.0553 1 .27 +.0248 0.61 + .0459 0 .97 +.0186 0.41 
Marital status +436.5027 1 .76 +454.9210 1.92 +351 .3361 0 .89 +604.0269 1.55 
Rural residence/UE -269.5247 1 .00 -407.8252 1.59 -260 .7451 0 .89 -353.8278 1.23 
Hourly wages -62.5933 2 .00* -78.4214 2.68* +6 .0560 0 .57 +.4351 0.04 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -391.7655 1.79 - - -403.7207 1.71 
Reaching limitations - - -297.1811 0.99 - - -238.6149 0.75 
Lifting limitations - - +189.6058 0.68 - - +171.7656 0.57 
Sensory limitations - - -536.4717 2.77* - - -487.9469 2.35* 
Speech - - -288.2659 0.63 - - -618.6239 1.29 
Hearing - - +2440.6417 2.60* - - +2201.9173 2.21* 
Mental disorders - - -938.3568 2.83* - - -830.9660 2.36* 
Nervous disorders - - -550.1149 1,34 - - -520.8357 1.19 
Constant +1709.3326 2. 59* +2570.9479 4.00* +141, .5361 0. 07 +1831.5128 0.95 
.10 - .29 - .04 - .20 -
N 72 - 72 - 72 - 72 -
*[29]. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table B.3. Labor force participation, black males, households receiving public transfers excluded^ 
1971 results using actual wages 1971 results 
reservation 
using 
wages 
Independent 
variables No health Health No health Health 
3 t 3 t 3 t 3 t 
Age -.0041 0 .95 -.0041 0.83 -.0043 0 .89 -.0025 0.48 
Education -.0026 0 .21 -.0008 0.06 -.0003 0 .02 +.0002 0.02 
Asset income -.0002 1 .68 -.0003 1.74 -.0001 0 .90 -.0002 1.35 
Family transfers +.0031 0 .73 +.0049 1.03 +.0024 0 .47 +.0065 1.25 
Nonrespondent income -.000007 0 .40 +.00001 0.50 -.000008 0 .45 -.000006 0.38 
Marital status +.2661 2 .56* +.2396 2.12* +.1703 1 .10 +.0549 0.35 
Rural residence/UE +.0998 0 .84 +.1202 0.94 +.0303 0 .23 +.0243 0.18 
Hourly wages +.0472 3 .68* +.0434 3.10* +.0040 1 .19 +.0053 1.49 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -.1095 0.98 - - -.2403 2.01* 
Reaching limitations - - -.0049 0.04 - - -.0616 0.50 
Lifting limitations - - +.1295 1.03 - - +.2580 2.00* 
Sensory limitations - - -.0167 0.16 - - -.1005 0.94 
Speech - - +.0325 0.12 - - +.0320 0.14 
Hearing - - -.1815 0.60 - - -.1704 0.63 
Mental disorders - - -.0783 0.54 - - -.1722 1.25 
Nervous disorders - - +.2213 1.07 - - +.1462 0.64 
Constant +.6734 2. ,43* +.7266 2.38* +.1702 0. 28 +.1432 0.22 
R2 .20 - .16 - .06 - .13 -
N 74 - 74 - 83 — 83 — 
*[29]. 
^Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table B.4. Hours worked, black males, households receiving public transfers excluded^ 
1971 results using actual wages 1971 results using 
reservation wages 
Independent No health Health No health Health 
variables 
p t e t e 
Age -16.8825 1 .63 -13 .0442 1 .26 -9 .4696 0 .87 -5 .6524 0 .51 
Education +22.7938 0 .79 -.8289 0 .03 +24 .1940 0 .82 +9 .8276 0 .31 
Asset income -.1565 0 .38 -.1615 0 .33 -, .3845 0 .90 -.3021 0 .61 
Family transfers -3.1827 0 .34 +11 .8716 1 .20 -3 .1881 0 .34 +9 .6913 0 .94 
Nonrespondent income +.0485 1 .10 + .0010 0 .02 + .0257 0 .54 -.0294 0 .64 
Marital status +712.4808 2, .62* +618 .4013 2 .38* +520, .2591 1, .42 +417 .6879 1 .20 
Rural residence/UE -119.5313 0, .42 -447 .2570 1, .60 -163, .0683 0, .55 -504 .7213 1 .71 
Hourly wages -55.1218 1, .76 —69, .5769 2, .35* +10, .2052 1, .26 +12 .9363 1 .67 
Stooping, walking limitations - - -320, .9058 1. 38 - - -425 .3694 1, .72 
Reaching limitations - - -220, .9946 0, .71 - - -103 .7169 0 .33 
Lifting limitations - - +201. 9683 0. ,69 - - +244 .3841 0. 80 
Sensory limitations - - -655, .6095 2 .  ,97* - - —608 .1239 2. 69* 
Speech - - -487. ,6480 0. ,82 - - -801 .6474 1. ,34 
Hearing - - +2288. ,5136 2. ,34* - - +2052 .2371 2. , 04* 
Mental disorders - - -908. 1377 2. 34* - - -735, .1229 1. ,83 
Nervous disorders - - -481. 5420 1. 18 - - -499, .1316 1. 18 
Constant +1643.8837 2. 43* +2554. 1630 3. 78* -460. 0071 0. 31 -117. 7513 0. 08 
R2 
.20 - 35 - 18 - ,31 -
N 58 - 58 — 58 - 58 -
*[29]. 
*Signifleant at the 5 percent level. 
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APPENDIX C. LABOR SUPPLY RESULTS USING 
THE EXTENDED MODELS 
In an attempt to increase the explanatory power of the models 
discussed in Chapter 3, we tested an extended version. Specifically, 
we tested the following model: 
Labor supply ~ Pg ^  ^1  ^^2 Educ&tion + Asset income 
+ 3^  Nonrespondent income + Marital status 4- Wages 
+ By Family transfers + 3g Rural residence + Public 
transfers + Private transfers + Net value of assets 
+ 3^ 2 Number of dependent children + 623'''&28 Health 
variables. 
We added private transfers, number of dependent children, net value of 
assets and disaggregated the health variables. Private transfers are 
sources of income such as insurance annuities and were added to see if 
the source of transfers made a difference. Net value of assets was 
included because the wealthier a person is, the less pressure may there 
be to work. A priori one would expect a negative relationship between 
the net value of assets and labor supply. Most estimates, however, are 
positive, suggesting that wealth may be a proxy for motivation. That 
is, people work harder in order to acquire wealth. The existence and 
number of children for males makes labor force activity more obligatory, 
other things equal. We expect a positive relationship. In this model 
we do not combine the health variables and we did in the models 
discussed in Chapter 3. We wish to see which specific limitations have 
an effect on labor force activity. 
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Table C.l presents the R of both the extended and basic models. 
For all but one sample, the extended model does, at best, only 
marginally better and sometimes does not do as well. Only for the black 
males who receive no DIABAPTD in the hours worked equations does the 
extended model do better. 
For younger white males, in the hours worked equations, the 
results using the extended model provide an insight into the effect 
of wealth on labor supply behavior. When the basic model is used, the 
asset income variable is significant and positive. When the extended 
model is used, the variable representing net value of assets is 
significant and positive but, the asset income variable becomes 
insignificant. This suggests that it is not the income received from 
assets which has a positive effect on labor supply so much as the wealth 
effect of owning assets which is consistent with the hypothesis noted 
above. The same result is not observed in other cohorts. 
Table C.2 presents the regression results for the health version 
of the hours worked equations for black males. In the extended model, 
the rural residence dummy and the has difficulty walking dummy become 
significant when they were not in the basic model. Also, the mental 
disorder dummy becomes insignificant in this model. We expect the 
rural residence variable to have a negative effect on labor supply 
because the value of home time may be greater in the country and/or 
employment opportunities are fewer. Disaggregating the stooping, 
walking, using stairs variable into its various components indicates 
that having difficulty walking reduces labor supply. 
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Using the extended model does not change the conclusions we 
reached in Chapter 3 regarding the impact of health on labor supply 
behavior. In general, the pattern we observed using the basic model 
is duplicated using an extended model of labor supply. 
—2 Table C.l. R of the basic and extended labor supply equations 
Cohort 
Labor force participation Hours worked 
No health Health No health Health 
1971* 1971^ 1971* 1971^ 1971* 1971^ 1971* 1971^ 
White males, aged 25-54, .09^ .09 .13 .15 .20 .11 .24 .16 
no DIABAPTD (.10) (.10) (.09) (.11) (.16) (.08) (.23) (.11) 
White males, aged 25-54, .09 .15 .10 .16 .17 .11 .23 .17 
no transfers (.10) (.16) (.10) (.18) (.13) (.10) (-19) (.14) 
White males, aged 55-64, .20 .09 .24 .18 .27 .12 .34 .14 
no DIABAPTD (.20) (.09) (.19) (.10) (.28) (.07) (.30) (.08) 
White males, aged 55-64, .16 .15 .18 .16 .25 .15 .30 .14 
no transfers (.17) (.15) (.20) (.15) (.27) (.13) (.28) (.14) 
Black males. .20 .02 .18 .08 .17 .10 .42 .35 
no DIABAPTD (.21) (.03) (.18) (.06) (.10) (.04) (.29) (.20) 
Black males. .19 .04 .24 .17 .23 .20 .39 .41 
no transfers (.20) (.06) (.16) (.13) (.20) (.18) (.35) (.31) 
*[29]. 
Regressions were run using the same data base but using reservation wages. 
c —2 The top row of figures refer to^^the R obtained when testing the extended model. The 
bottom row of figures refers to the R obtained when testing the basic model. 
Table C.2. Hours worked by black males using the extended model 
Households receiving no DIABAPTD 
Independent 1071^  iq71^  
variables 
Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio 
Age 
-4. 4531 0. 39 ,7958 0. 06 
Education -3. 0857 0. 12 +2. ,4439 0. 09 
Asset income 3950 1. 27 — .  ,5220 1. 58 
Private transfers - - ,4992 1. 77 
Nonrespondent income 
— • ,0034 0. 08 - ,  .0019 0. 04 
Marital status +480. ,9453 1. ,83 +800, .5361 1. 92 
Hourly wages 
-64. ,2156 2. ,34* -3, .8055 0. 32 
Family transfers +9. ,2178 0. 91 +7. ,5222 0. 71 
Rural residence/UE -707. 3968 2. ,74* -645, .8338 2. 15* 
No. of dependent children +131. 2385 1. ,81 +127, .8724 1. 60 
Net value of assets +. ,0222 1. ,88 +, .0239 1. 91 
Public transfers ,2060 1. ,62 -.2204 0. ,85 
Has dfficulty reaching -296, .4611 0, .89 -193, .1828 0. ,54 
Cannot reach +124, .0492 0, .19 +390 .8269 0. ,54 
Has difficulty walking 
-792, .7847 3, .24* -871 .9910 3. 39* 
Has difficulty using 
stairs -127, .8500 0, .47 -216 .0504 0. ,76 
Cannot use stairs -52 .9869 0 .07 -204 .8875 0, .26 
Has difficulty stooping +232 .3443 1, .00 +245 .7394 1, .00 
Cannot stoop +478, .3770 0, .78 +657 .3671 0. ,98 
Has difficulty lifting +62 .9335 0 .19 -58 .2076 0, .16 
Speech problems -158 .9253 0, .31 -468 .4929 0, .87 
Hearing problems +2794 .7224 3 .09* +2642 .2253 2, .77* 
Has difficulty seeing -568 .6837 2, .74* -606 .9037 2, .72* 
Has difficulty seeing 
with glasses 
-148 .3279 0, .44 +77 .4567 0, .20 
Mental disorders -633 .5059 1 .82 -636 .8936 1 .71 
Nervous disorders -634 .5978 1 .55 -637 .1954 1 .47 
Constant +2201 .6490 2 .96* +2264 .5443 1 .07 
72 - 72 -
R^  .42 —  .35 — 
[^29]. Regressions were run using actual wages. 
[^29]. Regressions were run using reservation wages. 
^Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Households receiving no transfers 
1971^  1971^  
Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio 
-14.9289 1.09 -8.9282 0.65 
-14.3274 0.43 -9.6397 0.29 
-.9789 1.50 -1.5684 2.35* 
-.0331 0.65 -.0621 1.19 
+840.7346 2.34* +899.1427 2.28* 
-55.8531 1.81 +8.7730 1.12 
+13.5601 1.17 +10.6554 0.93 
-644.6745 2.01* -715.8288 2.24* 
+93.5734 1.17 +53.2962 0.66 
+.0144 0.80 +.0182 0.99 
-185.0847 0.49 -63.0344 0.17 
+551.8959 0.66 +961.6108 1.20 
-813.4897 2.59* -989.4009 3.25* 
+79.2942 0.24 -11.7751 0.04 
+272.4301 0.31 +275.8675 0.32 
+163.8476 0.64 +140.3759 0.55 
+768.0884 1.09 +970.9567 1.40 
-101.5375 0.26 -249.3170 0.66 
-217.9608 0.30 -166.3748 0.22 
+2570.8090 . 2.47* +2420.7904 2.38* 
-548.3411 2.23* -635.2361 2.57* 
-395.5628 0.86 -200.6842 0.44 
-712.7172 1.60 -683.8794 1.55 
-443.8063 0.98 -416.5567 0.94 
+2493.6184 2.87* +704.7936 0.48 
58 - 58 -
.39 - .41 -
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APPENDIX D. CALCULATION OF THE 
OPPORTUNITY COST VARIABLE 
The opportunity cost variable in the application equation is the 
ratio of actual monthly wages of the respondent to the amount he would 
receive if he were accepted as a DI beneficiary. First, we describe 
how the expected monthly benefit amount was calculated and then how 
the actual monthly wage was calculated. 
Monthly Benefit Amount 
This calculation proceeds in three steps. First, the average 
monthly wage (AME) is determined. Then, the primary insurance amount 
(FIA) is calculated. Finally, the monthly benefit amount (MBA) is 
derived, which depends on family size and composition and is subject 
to minimum and maximum benefit constraints. 
1. AME calculation 
a. Eliminate earnings in the five years when earnings were 
the lowest from 1951 to date of application, if the 
respondent applied, or 1971 if he did not apply, and 
add the earnings in the remaining years. 
b. Eliminate quarters of coverage (QC) in the years eliminated 
in a, add up the remaining QC and multiply by 3. 
c. Divide a by b to get AME. 
2. PIA and MBA calculation 
a. The AME is used to calculate the PIA. See table D.l for 
the procedure. 
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b. The calculation of the MBA is presented in table D.2. 
Actual Monthly Wage 
If the respondent never applied or applied in 1971 and worked in 
1971, the actual monthly wage in 1971 was used. If the respondent 
applied prior to 1971 (1968, 1969, or 1970), earnings in that year were 
used if they were greater than zero. If they were equal to zero, 
earnings in the year the respondent last worked were used, if that year 
was not before the year in which he was disabled. For example, if a 
respondent applied in 1970 and his earnings in that year were zero, 
and he became disabled in 1968, earnings in 1969 would be used if 
nonzero. If earnings in 1969 were zero, then earnings in 1968 were 
used if nonzero. If earnings in 1968 were zero, then the opportunity 
cost of applying for benefits was equal to zero. If the respondent 
applied in 1971 and had zero wages, the above procedure was used.^  
If a person has a condition which is steadily deteriorating, then 
the procedure used to calculate actual wages does not reflect the true 
opportunity cost of applying for DI benefits. The amount he could earn 
prior to his impairment may not be what he could earn given the 
impairment. 
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Table D.l. PIA calculation^  
Year PIA 
1968-1969 
1970 
1971 
71. 16% of first $110 of AME 
+ 25. 88% of next $290 of AME 
+ 24. 18% of next $150 of AME 
+ 28. ,43% of next $100 of AME 
81. 83% of first $110 of AME 
+ 29. 76% of next $290 of AME 
+ 27, .81% of next $150 of AME 
+ 32, .69% of next $100 of AME 
90.01% of first $110 of AME 
+ 32 .74% of next $290 of AME 
+ 30 .59% of next $150 of AME 
+ 35 .96% of next $100 of AME 
+ 20 .00% of next $100 of AME 
*[30, p. 19]. 
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Table D.2. MBA calculation 
MBA = 100% of PIA if no dependents 
+ 50% of PIA for wife caring for dependent child 
+ 50% of PIA for dependent child^  
1968 $55 1. 
2 .  
1969-1970 $64 1. 
2 .  
1971 $70.40 1. 
2 .  
3. 
*[30, pp. 20-21]. 
[^30, p. 24]. 
AME 
= 0 - 150 150% of PIA 
AME 
= 151 - 650 80% of first $436 of AME 
+ 40% of next $214 of AME 
AME 0 - 200 150% of PIA 
AME = 201 - 650 80% of first $436 of AME 
+ 40% of next $214 of AME 
AME 
= 0 - 200 150% of PIA 
AME = 201 - 628 88% of first $436 of AME 
+ 44% of next $191 of AME 
AME — 628 - 750 175% of PIA 
